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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Introduction
In 2008, ten communities in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana entered into agreements 
with Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd (Newmont Ghana), who had already begun mining in 
the area. The agreements included promises by the company to create local jobs and 
fund local development projects, and agreed-upon rules for how the communities and 
the company would interact and make decisions. Ten years later, this report looks at the 
communities’ experience of those agreements and suggests how they might be improved. 
The agreements were renegotiated in 2014, and likely will be renegotiated again in 2018 or 
2019.
Around the world, mining companies and project-affected communities are increasingly 
entering into agreements. In some countries, benefit-sharing agreements are required 
by law before a mining company can begin operations. In other countries, companies will 
enter into agreements voluntarily, so that local communities welcome the company, and 
to avoid the risk of any local conflict. Communities can use agreements to reaffirm their 
rights, obtain protections from the project’s negative impacts, and share in the project’s 
economic benefits. Ghana’s laws do not require community-company agreements. 
We were contacted by members of the communities who requested that we advise on 
the how the agreements had been operating. Before agreeing to undertake the work, we 
visited the mining communities and Accra. We found a broad range of support with every 
stakeholder we spoke to, including the Government of Ghana’s Minerals Commission, local 
officials, unaffiliated community members, local NGOs, members of the governance struc-
tures set up by the agreements, and traditional leaders. 
We came back to the mine area and Accra in May 2017, where we interviewed more than 
100 people, including traditional leaders, local government officials, community representa-
tives, members of civil society and NGOs, farmers, youth, and members of the governance 
structures set up by the agreements. We also spoke to various Newmont representatives. 
We are not able to say whether the agreements have left the communities better off 
because there are not enough data to be able to compare the Ahafo communities with a 
similar group that has also been affected by a mine but did not enter into an agreement. 
However, we do make observations and suggestions that could help the agreements work 
better in the future, and better serve the interests of community members and, through 
that, the national government and Newmont. 
2. The Ahafo Mine
The mining industry is important to Ghana’s economy. Large-scale gold mines provide jobs 
for around 7,000 Ghanaians and support a further 66,000 jobs indirectly. Small-scale and 
artisanal gold mining, or “galamsey,” provides many more jobs but also creates unique 
environmental and social challenges. 
The Ahafo mine produced 349,000 ounces of gold in 2016. All of this was from surface 
mining in the southern half of the concession, which contains the host communities of 
Ntotroso, Kenyasi No. 1, Kenyasi No. 2, Gyedu, and Wamahinso. Newmont Ghana has also 
begun an underground expansion in the south, and has conducted a definitive feasibility 
study for mining to begin in the northern half of the concession, which includes the 
communities of Susuanso, Terchire, Yamfo, Afrisipakrom, and Adrobaa. Two thirds of the 
workforce in the area was engaged in agriculture before the mine began operations in 
2006.
2 IMPLEMENTING THE AHAFO BENEFIT AGREEMENTS: SEEKING MEANINGFUL 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AT NEWMONT’S AHAFO GOLD MINE IN GHANA
In August 2017, youth from the concession area demonstrated against the mine, complain-
ing of high youth unemployment, pollution, and unfulfilled development promises. In 
January 2018, the regional government urged Newmont Ghana to review the agreements 
to reflect the impact of underground mining and to undertake more community engage-
ment.
3. What is in the Agreements?
The communities and Newmont Ghana entered into three separate agreements: a Rela-
tionship Agreement setting up a multi-stakeholder governance structure (originally called a 
Social Responsibility Agreement); an Employment Agreement establishing targets for local 
jobs; and a Development Foundation Agreement arranging for income from the mine to be 
spent on local development projects.
The Relationship Agreement (RA) aims to encourage “harmonious” company-community 
relations, to enable the communities to make decisions with the company. It establishes: 
• The Forum, a 58-person body including representatives from traditional authori-
ties and government, Newmont Ghana, groups within the communities including 
women and youth, and moderators. Its purpose is to oversee the implementation of 
the agreements. 
• A 16-member Standing Committee within the Forum, which has extra powers. 
• The Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation (known as “NADeF”) to implement 
development projects in the communities.
• A Complaints Resolutions Committee to resolve complaints relating to the imple-
mentation of the RA.
• Other processes for community-company conflict resolution and communication, 
including tasking the Nananom, or chiefs, with mediating conflict between the 
communities and the company, preventing informal mining on the concession, and 
providing land for resettlement. 
The Community Consultative Committee (CCC), set up by Newmont Ghana in each district, 
is noted to be the preferred communication channel between the communities, company, 
and Forum. The RA also mentions land management, access, and compensation, with 
community participation in environmental, social, and reclamation management. In addi-
tion, the RA says that it “does not create any legally enforceable rights.”
The Employment Agreement (EA) sets out targets for local employment. The original 
(2008) EA required Newmont Ghana to have 35% of the Ahafo Mine workforce, including 
contractors, be “citizens” of the ten communities, and to increase this share of employment 
to 50% within ten years of gold production. In 2014, this number was renegotiated down 
to a 24% target, which must reach 35% after ten years of gold production. The agreement 
requires that at least 90% of unskilled labour employed in any year must be local citizens. 
The EA also promises Newmont Ghana-funded training for jobs at the Ahafo Mine. Like the 
RA, the EA says that it does not create legally enforceable rights.
The Development Foundation Agreement (DFA) is an agreement between Newmont 
Ghana and NADeF. It establishes that NADeF’s revenue for spending on development proj-
ects is to come from Newmont Ghana, which pays $1 for every ounce of gold it sells, and 
1% of its pre-tax income, net of some transactions. A percentage of NADeF’s total income 
is invested in an endowment fund; this percentage escalates over time, from 10% during 
the first five-year period, to 15% for the next five years, and so on. NADeF is controlled by 
a Board of Trustees comprised of community and company representatives as well as a 
chairman appointed by the Forum. The Board manages NADeF’s funds and approves devel-
opment project proposals from Sustainable Development Committees (SDCs) in each of the 
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ten communities. Each SDC is made up of seven community representatives, including at 
least one youth, one woman, traditional authorities, and an assemblyperson. The District 
Assembly, a local government entity, coordinates with NADeF on project budgeting and 
contracting. The DFA specifies a formula for how projects should be allocated to the differ-
ent towns, and across different categories of spending—from scholarships to infrastructure 
and cultural activities. Unlike the other Ahafo agreements, the DFA is binding.
As of December 2016, NADeF had received approximately US$23 million in contributions 
from Newmont Ghana. Its budget is around the same size as the local government in each 
of the two districts covered by the Ahafo lease. Thousands of scholarships and numerous 
construction projects have been financed by NADeF.
4. How have the agreements been operating? 
We started by asking about how the agreements were negotiated in 2008 and renegotiated 
in 2014. Newmont Ghana representatives explained that discussions between the commu-
nities and the company started in 2005. In 2006, the mine began, and an early version of 
the Forum was established. The moderator of the Forum led the negotiations.
Negotiation and renegotiation of the agreements
The agreements list objectives of fostering sustainable development, allowing the commu-
nities to benefit from the mining, and meeting concerns about unemployment. Community 
members interviewed emphasized that employment creation was a key concern of 
community members who knew about the negotiations. The communities’ narrative was, in 
effect, “land for jobs.” On the other hand, Newmont’s CEO is said to have suggested the $1/
ounce royalty and 1% of net profit transfer to the communities.
Interviewees suggested several challenges to ensuring the communities’ equal, mean-
ingful participation during negotiations. These challenges are linked to problems in the 
Forum and the agreements more generally. For example: 
• Many community members described the Forum’s Standing Committee as taking 
a dominant role in negotiations, and some Forum members who were not in the 
Standing Committee felt excluded. 
• The Forum’s moderator allegedly did not always allow opportunities for different 
community representatives to participate in the negotiations. 
• Some community members thought Newmont Ghana focused on chiefs and 
community power brokers, but ignored other community perspectives. One Forum 
member described this by saying, “when you cut the head off a snake, all that is left 
is the rope.” Relatedly, chiefs participating in the negotiations tended to dominate 
and silence other community representatives. 
• Some community members suspected that chiefs may not have been adequately 
informed and skilled to properly represent the communities during negotiations. 
• Many community members felt that their representatives did not properly consult 
or represent them during negotiations. This led to community members being 
“shocked” by outcomes, such as the reduction from 35 to 24% of the local employ-
ment target during the 2014 renegotiations.
Most people we spoke to said that the communities had a lawyer (or perhaps two) during 
the signing of the agreements. No other experts were made available to the communities. 
The lawyer apparently explained to the community negotiators what the draft agreement 
said but did not provide advice or advance their concerns. Such an arrangement likely left 
the community negotiators without enough support, information and preparation. 
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General implementation of the agreements
The agreements, and the mine more generally, affect a range of different communi-
ties with different priorities and experiences. Community members located within the 
active Ahafo South mine area shared experiences of environmental and social impacts, but 
also of opportunities, including employment and NADeF projects. Members of a satellite 
community described disruptions to their access to water, food, education, and other 
essential services; they also struggled to benefit from the agreements because they were 
located far from the community towns. Members of northern communities focused on 
future mining activities in the north. Many were impatient for the mine activities to reach 
them, in part because they thought the mine would bring more opportunities for jobs and 
economic stimulation, which so far were mainly enjoyed by communities in the south.
Other relevant communities, such as those located just outside of the mining area, are not 
included in the agreements. These communities miss out on many chances to benefit, but 
are still negatively affected by the mine. One example is Hwidiem, located near Kenyasi 
No. 2. One resident said that community members from Hwidiem bore the mine’s negative 
impacts, including hosting an influx of job-seekers and environmental pollution, but were 
not able to take advantage of any positive opportunities under the agreements.
Different individuals and groups within communities experienced the agreements 
differently. Individuals who benefitted from the agreements tended to be satisfied. These 
individuals included chiefs and opinion leaders, local contractors of the mine, and individu-
als who financially benefitted from Newmont Ghana’s initiatives. On the other hand, those 
who felt ignored were less satisfied. A representative of people with disabilities felt that 
their perspective was excluded from the Forum and other deliberative spaces. Community 
members who had been resettled, others whose wishes to be resettled were ignored, and 
those located in satellite communities or outside of the mine area tended to be dissatisfied 
with the agreements. Representatives from the District Assembly also had concerns about 
a lack of coordination between SDCs and the District Assembly, which is needed to align 
NADeF projects with local development plans.
Many community members were dissatisfied with information sharing and commu-
nication between Newmont and the communities. Community members alleged that 
representatives often do not share information about Forum discussions, and that commu-
nity queries to Newmont Ghana about issues like local employment numbers are some-
times handled in an unhelpful way. Representatives from Newmont Ghana also noted that 
it is difficult to reach the grassroots of each community, but highlighted the Community 
Consultative Committee’s work in connecting the company with community perspectives. 
They also confirmed that Newmont Ghana does not monitor whether Forum representa-
tives are meaningfully consulting within their community.
Some community members also there were no safe ways of complaining about the 
agreements. One Forum member warned that complaining could be risky, asking “why 
would [anyone] open their mouth? If they did it would be shut up.” Another community 
member felt he was not properly compensated for the loss of his land, but stopped pursing 
this complaint because “I don’t want to destroy my children’s future.”
Despite efforts to design new ways to encourage community participation, community 
members still feel excluded and face barriers. The agreements create various entities 
and processes to encourage community participation in decision-making regarding the 
allocation of benefits. But these entities and processes are undermined by differing 
levels of experience, education, and other sources of power imbalances. (Challenges in 
the operation of the Forum, the SDC, and EA community citizen validation process are 
discussed below.) The unfortunate result is that Newmont appears to be acting responsibly 
by encouraging community participation, but community members themselves are often 
unable to meaningfully participate in key decisions. Local powerbrokers exploit this gap.
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Implementation of the Relationship Agreement (RA)
The RA established the Forum to increase community participation in company 
decisions and improve openness and information sharing, but it failed to achieve 
these goals in practice. Some community members expressed frustration that the pres-
ence of chiefs at the Forum introduced challenges: on the one hand, chiefs were regarded 
as so powerful that other participating community members were reluctant to contradict 
them and felt silenced; on the other, some chiefs lack the language skills or confidence to 
organize collectively and resist undesirable company proposals. Community members and 
Newmont Ghana also suspected that Forum members did not always report what happens 
at Forum meetings back to community members. In addition, some community groups 
were underrepresented: there was no representative for people with a disability, less than 
one third of Forum representatives were women, and some youth representatives were 
older than the age group they represented.
The representative nature of the Forum is undermined by an influential Standing 
Committee and moderator. Interviewees said the Standing Committee would decide on 
the agenda for Forum meetings and proposals, and would often just tell Forum members 
what it had already agreed should be decided. The moderator also played a commanding 
role in meetings of the Forum and the Standing Committee. He was regarded as very 
knowledgeable, but several people interviewed saw him as too dominant and often dismis-
sive. This allegedly intimidated community representatives discouraged them from partic-
ipating in discussions. Various interviewees regarded the moderator as being too closely 
affiliated with Newmont and thus not acting impartially.
The participatory monitoring process in the RA has not yet occurred. The RA’s require-
ment for training about the monitoring process to be provided to participating community 
representatives also has not sufficiently reached community members. Community inter-
viewees generally said that they had not heard of any participatory monitoring program 
but thought it would be a good opportunity. The company now appears to be preparing to 
finally implement this initiative; nonetheless, community members highlighted the need to 
sensitize community members as to why it would be important to participate, and about 
the environmental dangers of living near a mine more generally. Concerns were also raised 
that participating community members would be viewed as unfavourable candidates for 
mine-related jobs.
It is unclear if the RA’s dispute resolution process is functioning effectively; if not, it 
could be because of its design and power imbalances. Despite the various grievances 
that community members shared with us, no interviewees shared experiences about 
engaging with the Complaints Resolution Committee. This may be because complaints 
from individuals aren’t provided for. Instead, community complaints must come from 
community towns (not individuals), and be communicated to the Committee by the chief or 
Omanhene. Given the challenges that even members of the Forum face in raising concerns, 
other community members may be reluctant to raise grievances if they have to liaise 
through chiefs—others may not even know that the process exists.
Implementation of the Employment Agreement (EA)
Although the mine created jobs for local community members, Newmont Ghana did 
not deliver on its original headline promise, which was to ensure that at least 35% of 
jobs went to community members. The data show that as of 2017 this target had been 
met but the original target of 50% was still a long way off. Regarding measurement, inter-
viewees were critical that part-time and temporary positions were being counted towards 
the total number of jobs created. Some community members believed that employers 
were more interested in hiring their “own people” than employing locals. 
Many community interviewees thought the process of certifying who counted as a 
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community citizen was unreliable. The process requires the chief, Assembly member, 
and youth leader to jointly validate whether or not a person is from the community. 
Yet sometimes leaders were accused of demanding and accepting bribes to validate as 
“community citizens” people from outside the communities. The 2014 review of the agree-
ments made the validation process more transparent but still faces challenges.
Community members and Newmont disagree on the relationship between the skill 
level of community members, and the training programs available to them. Some 
community members noted the transformative potential of the training, observing that 
community members who go through such trainings “come back as different people,” now 
able to earn a livelihood, for example, by driving bulldozers. Others lamented that while 
many locals had obtained university degrees with the assistance of NADeF scholarships, 
including in relevant disciplines, they found that there were no jobs available upon comple-
tion of their studies. Essentially, the community skill level has been rising, but community 
members still find it frustratingly difficult to get desired work with the company.
Implementation of the Development Foundation Agreement (DFA)
NADeF, the development foundation whose financing and mandate are set up in the 
DFA, was generally well regarded in the communities. It was seen as professionally run 
and successfully spending money on community projects and scholarships.
Community members and other stakeholders identified potential areas for improve-
ment, including project selection, value for money, inter-community projects, and 
NADeF’s funding formula. Not all projects were seen as delivering equal community 
value; sometimes this was due to SDCs needing to consult more effectively with the 
communities, and in other cases it was because of the restrictions around spending 
categories, which led to NADeF continuing to fund the renovation of chiefs’ palaces, for 
example, while scholarships were cut. One complication is that SDCs prioritize projects 
before knowing what they are going to cost, with the cost ultimately determined in the 
tender process. Another is that no cross-community projects, which might generate some 
benefits of greater scale, have been undertaken. Finally, there was dissatisfaction with the 
amount of money provided through the funding formula, which was not seen to keep up 
with population growth, the mine’s negative impacts, or the price of gold. 
Performance outside of the agreements
Two significant areas of company-community interactions—local supplier development, 
and compensation and resettlement—were generally not governed by the agreements 
and received mixed reviews by interviewees. Newmont Ghana undertook strong efforts 
to develop local suppliers, through the IFC-supported Ahafo Linkages Program, early on 
in the mine’s life even though it was not mentioned in the agreements. We spoke with 
suppliers who had benefited from this program and the company’s general openness 
to local businesses participating in the value chain of the mine’s activities. On the other 
hand, the company’s compensation and resettlement practices, which were included in the 
agreements only to the extent that they recognized that Newmont’s commitment was to 
that of Ghanaian law, continued to be a source of community grievances. Communities on 
the edge of the mine that were being resettled faced a greatly diminished quality of life and 
reported inadequate compensation being offered.  
5. Insights for the Design and Implementation of Benefit Agreements
This report seeks to provide some insights on the implementation of the agreements, since 
they are now a decade old and are regarded as an example of best practice by the World 
Bank. As we observed, negotiating agreements is just one step of a very complex process. 
What happens after agreements are signed may require even more attention.
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The Forum attempts to bring a variety of stakeholders together. Yet we observed that 
achieving true multi-stakeholder participation and collaboration is hard. Not all represen-
tatives have equal voice, and different representatives represent and consult with their 
constituents to varying degrees. The agreements’ focus on bringing different stakeholders 
into decision-making needs to go beyond having people in the room to actually targeting 
and facilitating meaningful and representative participation.
We also noted that it is hard to create new entities, such as the Forum, the SDCs, and the 
tender board, that work as intended. These new entities suffered from weak consultation, 
replicated existing power imbalances, were not always used, and sometimes created 
conflicts of interest that were not easy to resolve. More successful entities need to be 
designed to anticipate how people might act within them, perhaps by relying on an “honest 
broker” like the government or an international organization. 
We also observed that even for a national government like Ghana that has no policy or 
legal requirement for agreements, they are effectively a party to the agreement whether 
they like it or not. They therefore would be advised to develop a clear policy toward benefit 
agreements between communities and companies.
6. Insights for Better Corporate Performance
Companies with existing benefit agreements or who are considering new ones can learn 
from the Ahafo experience. We found a mismatch in the narratives of each of the company 
and community. The company focused on its $1/oz. and 1% of profit contribution; but 
community members believed they gave up land in exchange for the promise of jobs. 
Paying attention to the community narrative is important.
The implementation of the agreements themselves goes beyond spending the money 
and meeting employment targets. Both the company and the communities will need to be 
committed to continuous improvement, including taking baseline data and using a trans-
parent monitoring system, to have a successful agreement in the future.
Finally, we observed that many community-company interactions occur outside of the 
agreements. In Ahafo, many important aspects of the relationship, including compensation, 
resettlement, and support to local businesses in the supply chain, had little or nothing to 
do with the agreements. In some cases, Newmont Ghana went above the call of duty but 
in others it did not aspire to international standards. A more comprehensive set of legally 
enforceable agreements might have prevented some of the flashpoints that have occurred 
at Ahafo.
7. Recommendations for Consideration in the Renegotiation of the Agreements
In the body of the report, we offer 25 considerations for the renegotiation process, the 
agreements themselves, and their implementation. Here we summarize a selection of 
those, sometimes joining two or three together.
During the renegotiation of the agreements:
1. Provide community representatives at the Forum with independent, experienced 
legal counsel and technical assistance, and capacity building on negotiation skills, 
mining, and community agreements.
2. Publicize the renegotiations beforehand and consult widely within the communities.
3. Make the agreements available in plain-language, Twi versions.
4. Include more representatives of the communities as signatories to the agreement to 
encourage the participation of less dominant community representatives.
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Consider the following changes to the agreements:
1. A more representative Standing Committee and more trusted moderator, perhaps 
through election by Forum members. 
2. An independent grievance mechanism in which grievances can be lodged privately by 
individual community members without fear of retribution or discrimination. 
3. More ambitious compensation and resettlement standards, such as Newmont’s own 
standards, or those of the IFC. 
4. Local procurement development targets to encourage an escalating share of 
contracting work to the mine to be done by local companies. 
5. More ambitious and escalating employment targets that take into account the rising 
level of capacity of local community members. 
6. For Newmont Ghana’s contribution to NADeF, a profit term that is easier to monitor 
and verify than the current “net pre-tax income after consideration of all inter-com-
pany transactions.” 
7. Permitting and encouraging NADeF projects that would be shared by multiple 
communities. 
8. Auditing and adjusting the agreements for gender awareness and inclusion of 
under-represented groups. 
9. Making the agreements legally enforceable. 
During the implementation of the agreements (including before, during, and after the 
renegotiations):
1. Hold transparent meetings (of the Forum, the Standing Committee, and other 
committees), with agendas, minutes, and accessible presentations available in 
Newmont’s information offices and on the Internet. 
2. Collect local employment data, disaggregated by community, gender, full-time/
part-time, skilled/unskilled, etc., and report this to communities in a transparent and 
accessible manner. 
3. Publish, at the parent-company level, the contributions to NADeF and the BAsis for 
those contributions. 
4. Improve consultation between community representatives in the Sustainable Devel-
opment Committees and Forum and their constituents through capacity building on 
consultation and participation, increased time for consultation before decisions, and 
monitoring of consultation practices. 
5. Establish participatory environmental and social monitoring processes, accompanied 
by appropriate training and sensitization of community members.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Extractive-sector companies and project-affected communities are increasingly entering into formal 
agreements in order to acknowledge the provision of community consent to a project. Companies 
use such agreements to acquire a “social license to operate”1 in the area in which they work, 
thereby minimizing the risk of conflict risk for projects.2  From the perspective of project-affected 
communities, agreements with companies can act as a formal vehicle to reaffirm community rights, 
ensure the mitigation of the project’s adverse impacts, and provide a mechanism for sharing in the 
economic benefits that the project may bring. Communities may also seek to negotiate agreements 
that create legally enforceable protections of their rights, and with which they can hold corporate 
actors to account.3 These agreements go by many names, depending on the jurisdiction or project 
proponents, including impact and benefit agreements, community development agreements, 
benefit sharing agreements, negotiated agreements, and partnership agreements.4 In this report, we 
refer to them generically as benefit agreements (BAs). 
While some thirty-two countries mandate specific community benefits in their mining laws, only a 
handful of those countries, including Mongolia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and South 
Africa, require formal agreements that govern benefit allocation.5 In other countries, like most of 
Canada,6 BAs are considered de facto, unwritten, regulatory requirements.7 Ghana is among the 
large group of countries that have no BA requirements, whether enshrined in law or in practice.8
The Ahafo mine is an open-pit gold mine, with a planned underground expansion, in the densely 
populated and rural Brong-Ahafo region in central Ghana. The mine is owned entirely by Newmont 
Ghana Gold Ltd (NGGL),i a subsidiary of the Colorado-BAsed company Newmont Mining. Newmont 
bought the leases and licenses to mine and extract gold at Ahafo from Normandy Mining in 2002 
and began commercial production in 2006. At the time of construction, the project was expected to 
directly affect ten communities and displace approximately 20,000 people.9
NGGL signed three agreements in 2008 to govern company-community relations: a relationship 
agreement setting up a multi-stakeholder governance structure (originally called a social responsibil-
ity agreement), an employment agreement establishing targets for local hiring, and a development 
foundation agreement setting up a funding formula to contribute income from the mine to the 
local communities as well as establishing the institution to spend it. We refer to these agreements 
collectively as the Ahafo BAs in this report. The Ahafo BAs are noteworthy for a number of reasons: 
they were initiated voluntary by the company, they set up a complex institutional arrangement to 
govern negotiations and implementation, and—having been signed in 2008—these agreements are 
relatively mature for BAs signed in a low- or middle-income country. They were all renegotiated in 
2014, and are likely to be renegotiated again in 2018 or 2019.
We were contacted by members of the affected communities who requested that we might advise 
(pro-bono) on the implementation of the Ahafo BAs. Before agreeing to undertake the work, two of 
the authors conducted a scoping visit to determine the level of interest. We found a broad range of 
support with every stakeholder we spoke to, from the Government of Ghana’s Minerals Commission 
and local officials to unaffiliated community members, local NGOs, members of the BA governance 
structure, and chiefs. As we describe below, little published research exists on BA implementation; 
instead, almost all of the scholarly literature and practitioner guidebooks on BAs are about nego-
tiations. Thus, the interest from the community and Ghanaian government to improve on a nearly 
decade-old set of BAs align with our own interest, as part of a Canadian International Resources and 
Development Institute (CIRDI) project on “Making Benefit Agreements Work,” to develop knowledge 
to inform the successful implementation of BAs both in specific communities and more broadly. 
i We try to use the term “Newmont” for the parent company and “NGGL” for the Ghanaian subsidiary for clarity; 
when ambiguous, referring to both (e.g. Newmont and NGGL employees) or referring to a corporate practice 
even if undertaken in Ghana alone, we use just “Newmont” for brevity.
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All the direct costs for this work were funded by CIRDI, an institute founded by the University of 
British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, and Polytechnique Montreal, with additional in-kind 
contributions by the Africa Centre for Energy Policy, Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment, 
Independent Social Performance, and Simon Fraser University. 
The purpose of this report, as we state in more detail below, is to study the implementation experi-
ence of the Ahafo BAs’ and to suggest how they might be improved.
1.1 WHAT ARE BENEFIT AGREEMENTS?
BAs formally lay out how communities will be compensated for environmental and social costs 
and how they will partake in the economic benefits of projects,10 often in exchange for social 
license for the project.11 In addition to compensation and benefit-sharing, BAs can describe how 
adverse impacts can be mitigated, reaffirm and protect community rights, and define the relation-
ship between the company and the community, including how information is shared and issues 
addressed. BAs, if they are employed correctly, have the potential to contribute to poverty allevia-
tion through financial and economic opportunity,12 as well as build a positive relationship between 
the project proponents and the local communities and ensure that the environmental assessment 
and management process is upheld.13
BAs have been commonly used in Canada14 and Australia, and today their use is international15. 
BAs are often used in the resource extraction sector, but may also be negotiated for agriculture 
and forestry,16 urban,17 and infrastructure projects. In this report we restrict our focus to BAs in the 
mining sector.
Besides enshrining commitments to mitigate the social, cultural, and environmental costs of 
resource extraction, BAs are used to specify how the project proponent will bring additional benefits 
to the signatory communities. Three of the most common forms of economic benefits included in 
BAs are financial payments, jobs, and business linkages. Financial payments come in a variety of 
commitments, from annual payments to equity sharing, and can be delivered in a variety of ways, 
whether directly or through a trust fund.18 Job benefits involve specific efforts and/or targets to 
employ locals in both the mining company and its contractors’ work.19 Linkage benefits in BAs serve 
to increase the participation of local firms in the business opportunities spurred by a resource 
development project, especially supplying business services to the project proponent.20 As with jobs 
clauses, linkage clauses in BAs may be “pull” factors like specific targets for local employment or 
procurement, or “push” mechanisms like training programs and preferential hiring or contracting 
language. Some clauses in BAs create mandatory obligations on a party, while others are more 
open, for example, requiring “best efforts.”
BAs are not the only way to capture benefits from mining projects; legislation, voluntary corporate 
initiatives, and international standards are other ways in which community benefits can be achieved. 
In this report we do not take a stance regarding the optimality of BAs vis-à-vis these other instru-
ments.
Legislated resource development requirements can clarify company responsibilities, create clear 
rules, and stabilize the investment climate.21 Moreover, like a BA, legislation can capture resource 
development benefits for affected communities. In Ghana, for example, the 1991 Mineral Devel-
opment Fund, a central government-funded but locally-managed resource fund, was mandated to 
receive 10% of mineral royalties from development.22 This money was then paid back to local and 
traditional government to use for development projects.23  In 2016 a new act was passed, raising the 
royalty contribution to 20%.24
Voluntary corporate initiatives to ensure community consent may be achieved through corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, which can include BAs (assuming they are not required in the 
jurisdiction). While historically CSR has been reactionary, there has been a movement towards more 
proactive CSR initiatives.25 In one case study of the Aloca of Australia and Greening Australia relation-
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ships, researchers found that employing a collaborative and proactive CSR strategy reduced conflict 
and had positive benefits for both parties.26
Finally, guidelines and standards, including from corporate initiatives, such as the International 
Council of Mining and Minerals,27 or international financial institutions, such as the International 
Finance Corporation,28 can influence community participation in project planning, improve 
management of the local environment, and generate benefits for the community.29 While voluntary 
guidelines may not be enforceable, performance standards that are imposed as a condition to the 
provision of finance for the project may create strong incentives for compliance.
In spite of the range of alternatives to BAs to achieve community development from mining projects 
and improve company-community relations, there has been an “explosion” of new BAs30 as well as a 
number of “best practice” guides and model agreements.31 Yet as we will describe below, very little 
research has been done on what leads to successful implementation of BAs.
1.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF BENEFIT AGREEMENTS
As described in scholarly literature and practitioner guidebooks, leading practice in BAs includes 
early planning for implementation and monitoring. Loutit, Mandelbaum, and Szoke-Burke 
researched publicly accessible BAs and noted with approval that some of the agreements reviewed 
included an implementation plan, a dispute resolution framework, and a monitoring program.32 
Monitoring, including community-BAsed monitoring, is often recommended by guides as a practice 
that can lead to better implementation.33 Monitoring increases transparency and accountability, 
as long as the monitoring metrics are sound,34 and especially when there is a mechanism to 
address monitoring results or review the agreement.35 A dispute resolution framework can support 
successful BA implementation by being a way to address unanticipated results and implementation 
failures.36 
In spite of these strong recommendations, academic literature on BA implementation is one of the 
gaps generated by the fast-paced employment of BAs; resultantly, case examples of implementation 
is commonly identified as a topic in need of further research.37 Moreover, existing literature on BA 
implementation has focused on cases in Australia and Canada, with little information available from 
cases in low- or middle-income countries. It may also be the case that the fact most BAs are confi-
dential has limited the ability of researchers to learn what drives effective implementation. However, 
there are a few exceptions, as we note below.
O’Faircheallaigh compared the implementation of two uranium mining BAs in Australia and iden-
tified a long list of potential reasons for failure; these included omission of critical issues, rivalry 
between government agencies, lack of clarity and precision in the BA and relevant legislation, 
absence of specific penalties for non-compliance, absence of appropriate institutional arrange-
ments, inadequate resources, staff turnover, lack of information on the BA and relevant policies and 
legislation, inadequate BA implementation planning due to time constraints, lack of commitment to 
the agreement from all parties, inadequate consultation and preparation, complex and culturally 
inappropriate institutional arrangements, and inadequate implementer skills and capacities.38 
Subsequently, O’Faircheallaigh reviewed BAs negotiated in Australia and Canada and found seven 
necessities for implementation: adequate financial and human resources, empirical connection 
between policy initiatives and desired outcomes, clear and measurable goals, delineated implemen-
tation responsibilities, implementation to be at the forefront of policy design, adequate political 
support, and regular monitoring of progress towards relevant goals. 39
Prno, Bradshaw, and Lapierre assessed the implementation of BAs pertaining to three diamond 
mines in the Northwest Territories in Canada, and found that these BAs were, on the whole, meeting 
their objectives and delivering benefits, but not evenly: communities that had experience with prior 
negotiations, some authority over their land, and more political influence in the area benefitted the 
most from their BAs.40 Siebenmorgan and Bradshaw interviewed fourteen key informants involved 
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in a handful of confidential BAs in northern Ontario in Canada, and found that the BAs were failing 
to meet a number of the expectations of communities, in both the content of the BAs and their 
implementation. 41
O’Faircheallaigh, in a review of Australian BAs, found that implementation performance was 
relatively weak for almost all BAs, especially those that did not perform well on the author’s other 
measures of BA success (including cultural heritage protection, strong financial provisions, and 
employment provisions).42
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT
This report studies the implementation of the Ahafo BAs. The Ahafo BAs are often described as a 
best practice example in the literature43 but, as one of the Ghanaian government officials we spoke 
to said, “anything can be improved.” This report therefore seeks to identify those aspects of the 
Ahafo BAs’ implementation that have room for improvement, and to make concrete suggestions to 
the various audiences of the paper that they might consider, particularly if the BAs are renegotiated 
in 2018 or 2019. The three core questions we sought to answer, as we describe in further detail in 
the methodology section, are: (1) How do community members and other stakeholders regard the 
Ahafo BAs’ performance and implementation? (2) What are the challenges and barriers that have 
been experienced with regards to the Ahafo BAs’ implementation and performance? (3) How are 
company-community relations outside the specific jurisdiction of the BAs?
Our primary audience is the stakeholders involved in the Ahafo BAs, from government officials to 
Newmont managers, but especially the community members and their leaders. We use the term 
“community” in this report in reference to each of: (a) the level of the settlement, or community 
town, as are identified as being affected communities in the Ahafo BAs (the Ghana Census reports 
also label these settlements as communities); (b) the collective group of people living in those 
settlements whose common interest is defined vis-à-vis the mine and opportunities/challenges with 
its presence; and (c) as an attributive adjective that references those settlements or group of people 
with a collective interest, such as the term “community members” in the previous sentence. We wish 
for the results of this study to be informative, helpful, and actionable. Our secondary audience is 
policymakers and BA negotiators and practitioners in Accra and around the world who can learn 
from the Ahafo mine case. Of course, each mine, set of communities, and agreement(s) is different. 
Finally, as this project is part of an initiative to fill the knowledge gap around BA implementation in 
low- and middle-income countries, our third audience is scholars and researchers of community 
development in natural resource-rich areas, so that they can use this detailed review of the Ahafo 
BAs to inform a wider comparative analysis. 
The methodology of the research, as we explain later in the paper, is a single case study, in which we 
sought a comprehensive perspective from all sources available, including interviews conducted at 
the site and all other material we could find. This study qualitatively weighted the perspective of the 
affected communities over other stakeholders.
The rest of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Ahafo mine and its local 
context, including a brief summary of the history of mining and governance in Ghana as well as 
information on Newmont and the local communities. Section 3 includes more detailed information 
on the Ahafo BAs’ content and the development foundation that they establish. Section 4 reviews 
previous research findings on the Ahafo BAs. Section 5 explains the report’s methodology. Section 6 
discusses the results of the research, including multiple perspectives on the Ahafo BAs’ negotiation 
and renegotiation, performance of the each of the Ahafo BAs, and information about how the proj-
ect is performing outside of matters that are detailed in the BAs. Section 7 discusses the implications 
for designing and implementing BAs in light of the collective findings from the report. Finally, Section 
8 lists topics for consideration for the 2019 Ahafo mine BAs’ review and any BAs pertaining to new 
sites in Ghana or elsewhere.
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2. GHANA’S AHAFO MINE
2.1 GOLD MINING IN GHANA
The Republic of Ghana is a lowland, tropical country located on the West African coast bordered 
by Côte d’Ivoire to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to the east, and the Atlantic Ocean to 
the south. Ghana gained independence from British colonial rule in 1957 and became a republic 
in the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1960. While Ghana’s leading export commodities have 
traditionally been cocoa, gold, and timber, the economy has more recently diversified to export 
non-traditional commodities like pineapples, bananas, yams, and cashews.44 
The mining industry is important to Ghana’s economy. In 2014, mining comprised over 35% of the 
country’s merchandise exports with large-scale gold mining operations accounting for approxi-
mately 65% of the production.45 Ghana is Africa’s second largest gold producer after South Africa46 
and gold accounts for over 95% of Ghana’s total mineral revenues.47 As of 2011, Ghana’s gold mining 
sub-sector accounted for 95% of all foreign direct investment into the mining sector.48 
While large-scale gold mines provide a source of employment for an estimated 7,000 Ghanaians 
and support a further 66,000 jobs indirectly,49 their contribution to the country’s labour demand is 
significantly smaller than that from artisanal and small-scale gold mining. This includes “galamsey” 
miners (a term used in Ghana amalgamating the English phrase “gather them and sell,” which refers 
to informal mining without a license) that are estimated to directly support over one million Ghana-
ians and additionally provide employment opportunities for as many as five million more people in 
downstream industries and markets.50 However, there is currently a massive national crackdown on 
the “galamsey menace” for its environmental, political, and social impacts, which is accompanied by 
a media campaign.51 
The Minerals Commission of Ghana was established in 1992 as both the main promotional and 
regulatory body for the country’s minerals sector. It is responsible for the coordination and imple-
mentation of policies related to mining, including monitoring for compliance with Ghana’s mining 
laws and regulations.52 The Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703) remains the current mining law in 
Ghana. The Act stipulates compensation principles for holders of surface rights, including compen-
sation for crops and structures on the land, and references the goal of “localization,” or replacing 
expatriate workers with Ghanaians, but does not require any community-level agreements.
2.2 THE BRONG-AHAFO REGION AND THE AHAFO COMMUNI-
TIES
The Ahafo mine is located in the Brong-Ahafo region, the second largest of Ghana’s ten regions. The 
majority of the region lies in the forest zone and is a cocoa- and timber-producing area, with the 
northern part of the region being part of the savannah zone and a grain and tuber-producing area. 
Local government and traditional government each provide leadership and services in the region. 
The legislative wing of the region is the District Assembly. One third of its membership is appointed 
by the national government in consultation with local leaders, while the remaining members are 
elected on non-party lines. The Brong-Ahafo Region has nineteen administrative districts. Local 
government’s executive functions are run by District Chief Executives.53
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Figure	 2-1 Map	of	Brong	Ahafo	Region	Featuring	Asutifi	and	Tano	North	Districts54
The ten identified “host communities,” identified by NGGL because they overlap with the mining 
lease, are located in two districts inside the region: Asutifi North and Tano North (see Figure 2-1). 
The Ahafo South concession, within the Asutifi North district, contains the host communities of 
Ntotroso, Kenyasi No. 1, Kenyasi No. 2, Gyedu, and Wamahinso (see Figure 2-2). The host communi-
ties of Susuanso, Terchire, Yamfo, Afrisipakrom, and Adrobaa, are located in the Tano North district, 
within the Ahafo North concession (see Figure 2-2).55 To date, NGGL has only carried out mining 
within the southern concession area; the northern communities have only experienced exploration 
activities. While there is no formally disclosed date for when the development of the Afaho North 
mine will occur, in its first quarter 2018 results, Newmont noted that Ahafo North has advanced to a 
definitive feasibility study.56
Traditional authorities possess considerable institutional relevance and influence in rural Ghanaian 
communities. The Ahafo mine falls within the Ashanti kingdom, the seat of which is in Kumasi. The 
Ashanti king recognizes a number of Omanhene, or paramount chiefs, each of whom administers a 
“stool,” or traditional jurisdiction, through an oath of allegiance which includes managing traditional 
land. Within the Ahafo mine communities, Kenyasi No. 1, Kenyasi No. 2, and Ntotroso are host to 
paramount chiefs, while Gyedu and Wamahinso are represented by divisional (or autonomous) 
chiefs. The paramount chiefs exert political control over the various sub-chiefs that represent major 
communities within their respective stools, as well as over the village chiefs that represent smaller 
communities. Disputes are typically resolved at the village level by sub-chiefs and village chiefs in 
consultation with elders. Chiefs at all levels play a role in stool land allocation.
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Figure	 2-2 Map	of	Ahafo	North	and	South	Mines	and	Communities57 
In 2010, according to the 2010 census,58 the five host communities in Ahafo South were also the five 
largest communities in the district, with a population ranging from over 11,000 in Kenyasi No. 2 to 
just over 1,600 in Wamahinso. Two thirds of economically active people in the district were engaged 
in agriculture; four fifths of the workforce were employed through informal markets including 
subsistence farming. The total fertility rate in the district was 4.3 children per woman, and less than 
half of houses had electricity. In Ahafo North, the five host communities were all among the largest 
eight communities in that district, with a population similarly ranging from over 11,000 in Yamfo to 
under 1,600 in Afrisipakrom.59 
2.3 NEWMONT AND THE AHAFO CONCESSION
Newmont, an American company registered on the New York Stock Exchange, was founded in 1916 
and is one of the world’s largest gold companies. Newmont presently operates in seven countries 
with approximately 23,000 employees and contractors worldwide.60 The Ahafo mine became part 
of Newmont’s portfolio in 2002 with its acquisition of the Australian company Normandy Mining. 
Newmont’s initial intent with Ahafo was to sell it immediately after acquisition, but after a geological 
re-evaluation in 2003, Newmont decided to initiate what would become an aggressive three-year 
drilling program that ultimately resulted in a reassessment of Ahafo’s ore reserves from 3.3 million 
to 12.6 million ounces of gold in 2006.61
The Ahafo BA approach originated from lessons learned by Newmont from its Yanacocha gold 
mine in Peru. In the Peruvian case, a development foundation called ALAC (Asociacion Los Andes 
de Cajamarca) exists.62 Newmont’s experiences in Peru fostered the creation of the Ahafo Social 
Responsibility Forum, which later signed the BA establishing the Newmont Ahafo Development 
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Foundation (NADeF).63 NADeF’s first intentions of focusing upon entrepreneurial development, 
institutional capacity building, and human capital development are parallel to ALAC’s goals. 
The Ahafo South mine project sits on a lease concession of approximately 137,000 acres. The 
operation currently includes three open pits moving through about 95,000 tonnes of ore per day, 
facilitated by three excavation shovels, thirty-eight 141-tonne trucks for moving material, and 
a processing plant. The processing plant includes a rock crushing plant, an ore grinding circuit, 
several CIL (carbon-in-leach) plants, elution and counter current decantation circuits, and a tailings 
waste disposal facility.64 This led to a production of 349,000 ounces of gold during 2016. The costs 
applicable to sales for the Ahafo project were on average $655/oz for the first 6 months of 2016 and 
$743/oz for the same period in 2017. The average all-in sustaining costs for the same two six-month 
periods were $888/oz and $934/oz respectively.65
In 2017, NGGL announced in 2017 that it would build a new underground mine, known as Subika, 
and expand Ahafo Mill, the processing plan, capacity by 50% by adding a grinding mill, a crusher, 
and a leeching tank.66 The Subika underground mine received environmental approval and permits 
in March 2017 and is expected to produce 1.8 million ounces of gold over an approximate 10-year 
mine life. Subika supports gold production at Ahafo through at least 2029 without needing to access 
Ahafo North. The mill expansion is currently under construction. On April 7, 2018, a mill expansion 
tunnel collapsed, killing six contractor employees.67 Work was suspended to conduct a risk assess-
ment and was reportedly resumed as of April 10, 2018.68 NGGL expects first gold production at the 
mill expansion in the first half of 2019 and commercial production starting in the second half of 
2019.69
2.4 RECENT CONTROVERSY
On August 1, 2017, youth from the concession area demonstrated against the Ahafo Mine.70 News 
reports state that the demonstration was fomented by concerns about high youth unemployment, 
pollution concerns, and unfulfilled community development promises.71 Youth leaders accused 
Newmont of not sharing detailed statistics on non-local employment, failing to award contracts to 
companies owned by community members, and deceiving locals by posting ads yet hiring outsiders. 
The protestors rejected Newmont’s claims that locals lack the qualifications and experience to be 
hired, and accused Newmont of hiring outsiders in more lucrative, permanent, secure, and strategic 
positions. Moreover, the demonstrators expressed concern regarding the lack of an agreement that 
addresses the Subika underground mining project, as well as the opaque nature of most company 
activities.72 A Newmont press release reiterated the company’s commitment to “transparent and 
respectful stakeholder engagement” as well as its impact on the local workforce and economy.73 
It appears that this was not a spontaneous demonstration: the youth had informed Newmont on 
December 13, 2016, disrupting an Environmental Protection Agency public hearing about the under-
ground mining,  that continuing project development without addressing youth unemployment 
would result in a demonstration.74 Following the demonstration, Regional Minister Kwaku Asomah-
Cheremeh and Newmont management agreed that they would meet with stakeholders, including 
the youth leaders, about how to resolve the matter. Youth leaders agreed to wait for the minister to 
make the next move.75 Months later, on Tuesday, September 12, 2017 youth leader Kennedy gave 
a one-week ultimatum to the Regional Minister to start employing the youth of the area or face 
another demonstration.76
In response, the regional government established a seven-member committee to look into the 
claims and concerns of the youth in the five communities affected by the current operations of 
NGGL. The committee’s findings and conclusions were captured in a white paper issued by the 
Regional Coordinating Council under the signature of the Regional Minister on January 26th, 2018. 
Among other things, the white paper urged Newmont to “review the Social Responsibility Agreement 
to reflect the impact of underground mining,” put up a district hospital by December 2018, and 
initiate steps to undertake more engagement than established in the BA. The white paper also 
identified responsibilities for the District Assembly and the leadership of the concerned youth to 
foster coexistence with the mine.77 
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3. WHAT IS IN THE AGREEMENTS
 In this section we summarize the contents of the Ahafo BAs signed in 2008 as well as changes to 
the BAs following renegotiations in 2014. (In section 6.1 we describe the community experience 
with the negotiation and renegotiation.) In addition, we describe the subsequent spend through 
the Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation (NADeF) and NGGL corporate social responsibility 
initiatives that were not part of the BAs. We BAse our analysis of the 2008 agreements on the 
publicly available copies of those agreements. One peculiarity of those copies is that the signature 
pages for the SRA and EA appear to have been switched out for the signature page of the DFA, and 
thus feature the signatures of representatives from NGGL and NADeF, rather than the signatures of 
representatives of the communities listed as parties to the agreements.
3.1 THE 2008 AHAFO BENEFIT AGREEMENTS
3.1.1 Social Responsibility Agreement
The Social Responsibility Agreement (SRA) between the Ahafo local communities and NGGL aims to 
ensure that company-community relations are harmonious,78 that the community participates and 
works with the company, and that the ten affected communities experience sustainable economic 
and social development.79 
One of the SRA’s main focuses is the Forum. Under the SRA, the Forum originally comprised fifty-six 
different members, including traditional authorities and government, NGGL, community represen-
tatives, and moderators.80 Its purpose is to oversee the Ahafo BAs’ implementation.81 The SRA also 
established the sixteen-member Standing Committee, which takes on the role of the Forum during 
an emergency or in between Forum meetings.82 
The SRA also established NADeF, whose purpose is “to fund sustainable development projects in the 
Community.”83 Further details about NADeF are contained in the Development Foundation Agree-
ment, which is discussed below.
While the agreement says that it “does not create any legally enforceable rights,”84 it established 
a Complaints Resolutions Committee to resolve complaints relating to the implementation of the 
SRA.85 This committee is made up of the Forum moderator and co-moderator, company representa-
tives, and community delegates.86 
Finally, the SRA delineated various systems for community-company conflict resolution and commu-
nication. The Nananom, or chiefs, are tasked with mediating conflict between the community and 
the company, preventing informal mining on the concession, and providing land for resettlement.87 
The Community Consultative Committee (CCC), set up by NGGL in each district, is cited as the 
preferred communication channel between the community, company, and Forum.88 Land manage-
ment, access, and compensation are also outlined in the agreement, with community participation 
in environmental, social, and reclamation management.89
3.1.2 Employment Agreement
The Ahafo Social Responsibility Agreement: Local Employment Agreement (EA) endeavoured to 
address employment of affected communities’ members at the Ahafo mine.90 Like the SRA, the EA 
contained a provision aimed at rendering the agreement not legally enforceable; specifically, the 
parties renounced their rights to litigate any disputes arising out of the EA.91
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This agreement required NGGL to adopt a policy to have 35% of the Ahafo Mine workforce, including 
contractors, be “citizens” of the ten affected communities, and to increase this share of employment 
to 50% within ten years.92 A person is considered a citizen if they, their parents, or their spouse is 
from the town, or if they live in the town and have immovable property in or near the town; the 
youth leader, Assembly member, and chief may also name someone a citizen.93 A formula is spec-
ified on how unskilled jobs should be allocated across the ten communities; factors that increase 
a town’s entitlement to jobs include population, land area, and “commitment to this Agreement.”94 
Local employment rates are reported yearly and, if goals are not met, NGGL must provide an expla-
nation.95 The EA also promises Newmont-funded training for jobs at the Ahafo Mine.96 
3.1.3 Development Foundation Agreement
The Development Foundation Agreement (DFA) is an agreement between NGGL and NADeF, 
which concerns NADeF’s funding and governance. Unlike the other Ahafo BAs, the DFA is binding,97 
perhaps because the community is not a party to the agreement (except via community repre-
sentatives on the NADeF boards). DFA-related disputes are arbitrated under the Arbitration Act of 
Ghana.98 
NADeF’s revenue comes from a combination of a volume-BAsed royalty and a profit share of the 
mine’s output: $1 for every ounce of gold sold, and 1% of “net pre-tax income after consideration of 
all inter-company transactions” plus an adjustment for the disposition of assets.99 In other words, if 
the mine produces 500,000 oz of gold and makes $250 million (after NGGL has paid Newmont for 
some goods and services but before taxes), then $0.5 million ($1/oz) plus $2.5 million (1% of profits), 
or a total of $3 million, will be paid to NADeF to be spent on development projects. A percentage of 
NADeF’s total income must be invested in an endowment fund; this percentage escalates over time, 
from 10% during the first 5-year period, to 15% during the second 5-year period, and so on.100 
The DFA sets out a governance structure for NADeF. NADeF is controlled by a Board of Trustees 
equally comprised of community and company representatives as well as a Forum-appointed 
chairman.101 The Board manages NADeF’s funds and approves development project proposalsii from 
community towns.102 In addition, NADeF has a nine-member Tender Board made up of chiefs, youth, 
local government, and NGGL representatives, which evaluates and recommends development 
project applications to the Board of Trustees.103
A stated goal of the DFA is sustainable development. The DFA defines sustainable development as 
development that: lasts from generation to generation; is BAsed on actual needs of the community; 
serves and is owned by the majority of the people; can be maintained with available income; is 
planned and can be monitored and evaluated; has long term benefits; and is committed to the 
idea that NADeF business is conducted in the best interests of NADeF and the community.104 Each 
community has a Sustainable Development Committee (SDC), which is made up of seven community 
representatives, including at least one youth, one woman, traditional authorities, and an assembly 
person; each SDC selects projects BAsed on the needs of its community town, in consultation with 
the local government’s District Assembly, and submits project proposals to NADeF.105 The agreement 
specifies rules for how much should be invested in each category of sustainable development (see 
Table 3-1). The resulting infrastructure is jointly owned between the community and the District 
Assembly.106 As with the EA, funding for projects in community towns is BAsed on a formula includ-
ing population, area, and commitment to the agreement.107 
ii  DFA, s. 6.1(iii) uses the term “applications” rather than “proposals”, but the rest of the agreement speaks 
about community towns submitting proposals through SDCs, so it is assumed that applications and proposal 
are used interchangeably in the agreement.
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Table	 3-1 Categories	of	Sustainable	Development	for	NADeF	Spending108
Category Example of Acceptable Project % Allocated
(i) human resource  
development 
Scholarships or pre-job training (s. 13.2) 24%
(ii) provision of  
infrastructure;
Water, Electricity, Roads, Clinics/Health Centres, Schools, 
Toilet facilities, Incinerators (s. 13.3)
23%
(iii) provision of  
social amenities;
Community Centres, Police Posts, Community Libraries 
(s. 13.4)
18%
(iv) economic  
empowerment;
Employment - skilled & unskilled; Establishment of 
factories / cottage industries; Credit facilities; Market 
Stalls (s. 13.5)
17%
(v) protection of  
natural resources; and
12%
(vi) support for cultural 
heritage and sports
Festivals,Palaces, Cross cultural activities and protocols, 
Sports (s. 13.6)
6%
3.2 THE 2014 RENEGOTIATED AHAFO BAs
Unlike many investor agreements between a national government and mining company, the SRA 
expressly allowed for a review of, or amendments to, the agreement at any annual meeting.109 This 
occurred in 2014 for all three agreements. The main changes are summarized below.
3.2.1 Relationship Agreement
The main substantive changes of the Social Responsibility Agreement, retitled the Relationship 
Agreement (RA) following its 2014 renegotiation, center around the Forum. First, the Forum now has 
fifty-eight members, and now includes four queen mothers (who are the traditional female authority 
figure alongside the male chief), as well as each district’s Community Consultative Committee 
moderator; the chief farmers’ seats have been removed, and the number of members of parliament 
have been reduced to two.110 Second, the Forum’s moderator’s remittance is now determined and 
paid for by the company;111 it had previously been determined by the Forum and paid for out of 
NADeF funds.112 Third, the Forum now meets at least once every quarter instead of twice a year.113 
Fourth, NGGL must now annually publish a flyer or bulletin to disseminate the Forum’s decisions 
and matters of interest relating to the Ahafo BAs within the ten affected communities,114 which was 
only done biannually under the 2008 SRA.
A 2013 “Agreement Review Report,” which seems to describe different stakeholders’ recommenda-
tions for the renegotiations, and which was provided to us by Newmont just before publication of 
this report, also shows that the CCC for Ahafo South requested that the RA be amended to remove: 
(i) that “the parties hereby renounce their rights to enter into any form of litigation or arbitration 
on any disputes or grievances arising out of this Agreement;” and (ii) that the agreement “does not 
create any legally enforceable rights.” The Standing Committee’s “comments for Forum consider-
ation” state “Agreed – Cannot trample on Individual rights. Delete the last Sentence.”115 Yet, while 
the 2014 no longer features the prohibition on litigation, it does still contain the assertion that the 
agreement does not create legally enforceable rights.
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3.2.2 Employment Agreement
Under the 2014 EA, there are smaller local employment goals, new hiring procedures, and a new 
committee to manage employment issues. The Ahafo Mine local employment goal, previously 
35% with an aspiration to 50%, was reduced in 2014 to 24% with an aspiration to reach 35% within 
ten years.116 However, at least 90% of unskilled labour employed in any year must now be local 
citizens.117 Recruitment policy changes affect unskilled labour: when an unskilled employment 
opportunity arises at the Ahafo Mine, NGGL selects and notifies one or more of the ten affected 
communities. An employee is then selected from among the interested citizens of the town(s),118 and 
chiefs may now nominate every fifth person to be employed from their town through a separate 
process where an employee is chosen randomly from a group of shortlisted candidates.119 More-
over, community members no longer have to validate their citizenship until they are shortlisted 
for employment.120 Finally, the 2014 EA establishes an Employment Committee made up of NGGL 
human resources representatives and delegates from each District. This committee’s purpose is to 
monitor local employment trends at the Ahafo Mine and the citizen validation process, as well as any 
other employment related tasks as assigned.121
3.2.3 Development Foundation Agreement 
Changes to the Development Foundation Agreement (DFA) in 2014 concern NADeF’s governance 
boards and the fund allocations. The 2014 DFA alters the composition of NADeF’s Board of Trustees 
to have a higher share of community representatives (including at least one woman and at least two 
non-Forum members) but this change is balanced by the fact that the chairman is now appointed 
by NGGL rather than the board.122 Additionally, the 2014 DFA articulates a board turnover protocol123 
and enlarges the Tender Board to include the executive secretary of the NADeF board and the Chair-
man of the Projects Committee of NADeF.124 Compared to the NADeF fund allocations under the 
2008 DFA, the 2014 renegotiations support cultural heritage and sports projects (+10% of allocation) 
at the expense of natural resource (-8%) and social amenity related initiatives (-2%).125 In addition, 
some NADeF funds are now earmarked for NADeF administration and incidental expenses.126 How 
project funds are doled out to communities also changed: the amount of a community land located 
within the mining lease now carries more weight than population, and funding is clearly allocated to 
each community instead of being earmarked BAsed on each community’s commitment to the Ahafo 
BAs.127 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT FUNDING FROM THE BAS
In this sub-section we compare the value contributed to NADeF with the production volume (sold) 
and costs reported in Newmont’s annual reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation, or NADeF, was established by the 2008 DFA to 
encourage greater responsibility and self-reliance of the host communities near the Ahafo mine.128 
NADeF’s vision is that “our communities achieve prosperity and self-reliance,” and the foundation’s 
mission is “to empower communities through grants, knowledge sharing, partnership, and capacity 
building to achieve sustainable development.”129 As of December 2016, NADeF had received a total 
of approximately US$23 million through commitments made by NGGL in the DFA.130 NADeF’s current 
assets—comprising its endowment fund, which contains the savings for the future, and its commu-
nity project fund, which pays for the community projects—were worth US$11.9 million, nearly three 
quarters of which was in the endowment fund.131 
Table 3-2 below generates a “predicted” contribution to NADeF by: (1) taking the gold price,132 (2) 
subtracting out Newmont’s self-reported costs per oziii to identify the profit margin, (3) multiplying 
that by Newmont’s self-reported volume of gold sold to identify the profits from the mine,  
iii  Costs applicable to sales plus depreciation and amortization, from the annual reports.
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(4) multiplying that by 1% following the formula in the DFA, and then (5) adding the volume of 
gold sold multiplied by $1/oz. Obviously, this math is too simple, as the DFA also allows for any 
“inter-company transactions” to be subtracted out. These transactions might include a loan from 
Newmont to NGGL, for example, or a marketing fee paid to sales agents in a Newmont affiliate in a 
third country. On top of that, we have no way of unpacking the cost numbers (which vary wildly by 
year) or matching them to the actual amount of ounces of gold produced versus the amount sold. 
The predicted contribution, on the penultimate line, can be compared to the actual contribution 
on the last line, as reported in NADeF annual reports (which was converted to USD at the then-ex-
change rate by the authors).
Table	 3-2 Predicted	Contribution	to	NADeF
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Avg yer gold price (/troy oz) $872 $972 $1,225 $1,572 $1,669 $1,411 $1,266 $1,160 $1,251
Combined costs ($/pz) $534 $569 $600 $611 $738 $679 $698 $780 $1,163
Volume gold sold (oz) 520,800 546,400 545,000 566,000 561,000 570,000 571,878 332,000 349,000
Predicted contribution 
($1+1%)
$2,280,896 $2,750,304 $3,948,689 $6,002,543 $5,783,798 $4,743,711 $3,822,433 $1,593,799 $655,213
NADeF contribution $843,314 $1,409,255 $1,852,871 $2,8820,812 $4,610,977 $3,950,489 $4,360,458 $2,067,129 $944,331
As can be seen from the table and represented in Figure 3-1 below, our estimates predicted much 
higher transfers to NADeF during the earlier years, but lower transfers to NADeF during later years, 
and summed over all nine years the predicted and actual transfers are within an error of 40%. This 
error level indicates that the amount of funds paid to NADeF corresponds to the same order of 
magnitude as one might reasonably predict using publicly-available figures; however, it still corre-
sponds to a gap of $8.7 million. That said, NADeF’s endowment appears to have appreciated more 
than one might have predicted at the outset. We have not modeled the endowment returns but at 
first glance they are significant.
Figure 3-1 Predicted	and	Actual	Contributions	to	NADeF
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To get a sense of the relative magnitude of NADeF versus other local government expenditure, we 
compare NADeF’s project budget with the entire budget of the district assemblies for each of the 
two districts within the mine area (Asutifi and Tano North). In 2016, NADeF spent GHS 7,861,494 
on projects, invested GHS 11,605,856, and purchased GHS 9,750 worth of non-current assets, for a 
total expenditure of GHS 19,477,100.133 Comparatively, the two District Assemblies were projected to 
spend, respectively, GHS 9,091,057 and GHS 6,603,421.45 in 2016.134 Of NADeF’s budget, just 4.17% 
covered its own expenses, probably a far lower share than the District Assemblies whose salary 
obligations alone would have been much higher. Thus, NADeF’s contribution on local public good 
projects is substantial.
Finally, in Table 3-3, we describe NADeF’s deliverables. This table delineates NADeF’s development 
outcomes as identified in a Newmont-contracted report to evaluate the foundation’s track record. 
Table	 3-3 Development	Outcomes	from	NADeF135
Area of Development Outcomes
Human Resources 6177 students had received scholarships
Funding for writing, reading, and listening skill program
Grants to civil society organizations that work in youth empowerment, 
entrepreneurship, and girl’s education
Exam preparation programs
Quality Improvements in BAsic Schools five-year program started in 
2015
Economic Empowerment 900 microfinance and start-up capital fund clients reached
Infrastructure and Social 
Amenities
75 infrastructure projects completed and handed over to the District 
Assemblies
Natural Resource Protec-
tion
4% of NADeF’s annual spending goes to natural resource conservation
Cultural Protection Support programs for building and maintaining culturally significant 
buildings
Support for maintaining and protecting cultural artefacts
Funding program encourages inclusive, respective, and participatory 
cultural heritage
Sports Programs aimed at enhancing participation and appreciation of 
sports
3.4 WHAT’S NOT IN THE AGREEMENTS?
Though the Ahafo BAs and NADeF play crucial roles in development of the area around the Ahafo 
Mine, they are not the only institutions initiated by NGGL that support local communities and 
people. As we describe in later sections of the report, the Ahafo BAs only cover some fraction of 
company-community interactions. Understanding the Ahafo BAs requires understanding their role 
in that wider context.
On the governance side, two types of relevant committees that exist but were not established by the 
Ahafo BAs are the Women’s Consultative Committee (WCC) and Resettlement Negotiation Commit-
tees (RNCs). The WCC, according to Newmont, endeavours to augment women’s participation in 
decision making and empowers women to be economically self-sufficient through the provision of 
small loans. There are ninety-five members, including queen mothers and elected representatives.136 
An RNC is formed for each community that will be resettled to advocate for community interests 
during resettlement entitlement negotiations.137 Each RNC is made up of affected residents, tradi-
tional leaders, government agencies, and non-profit organizations.138 
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On the programmatic side, two economic development initiatives outside of the Ahafo BAs are the 
Agricultural Improvement and Land Access Program (AILAP) and the Ahafo Linkages Program (ALP). 
AILAP assists affected farmers by providing farming inputs and technical assistance and promoting 
land access agreements: AILAP encourages farmers to restart farming after resettlement, according 
to Newmont-hired consultants.139 ALP, on the other hand, funds small and medium enterprises in 
the local area140 with the aim to increase the participation of local businesses in the mining project 
and bring additional benefits to the surrounding communities. According to university researchers 
Lawson and Bentil, ALP has supported forty-two businesses and improved the capacity of forty-nine 
local, non-mining related businesses as of 2013.141
Finally, there are a few noteworthy absences in the Ahafo BAs. In terms of compensation for liveli-
hood termination (via acquiring farmland for mining) and resettlement (when dwelling territory is 
used for mining), the RA merely indicates that NGGL should negotiate “with the person or group of 
persons to whom the compensation must be paid in line with the established negotiation process 
and in line with Ghana Legal Processes,”142 and that NGGL and the community “agree to observe 
the laws of Ghana regarding access to land and compensation.”143 Thus rather than establishing a 
mutually satisfactory way to manage the complex and critical issues concerning displacement and 
resettlement of community members, the BAs fall back on Ghanaian law. As discussed in the next 
section, these omissions led to a number of flashpoints that fall mostly outside the scope of the BAs 
themselves; as such, while underlining the importance of managing the question of displacement 
and resettlement in ways that are acceptable to community members and which respect their 
legitimate rights to the lands and resources, this report does not feature detailed findings or recom-
medations on this issue.
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4. EARLIER FINDINGS ON THE AHAFO BAs
In this section we summarise the existing body of findings and research concerning the Ahafo mine, 
and the Ahafo BAs in particular. This includes research prepared, funded, or otherwise closely 
affiliated with Newmont, and independent research conducted by academic and other researchers. 
We also discuss awards that Newmont has received.
4.1 NEWMONT OR NEWMONT-FUNDED OBSERVATIONS
In 2009, Newmont published a global review of its community-facing practices following a 2007 
shareholder request.144 Ahafo was one of the sites chosen for an in-depth examination, and 
researchers for the study visited it in October 2007. Overall, they were impressed with Newmont’s 
“proactive approach”145 and investment in community development projects. They remarked that 
the Forum and other formal structures served to channel “community concerns and frustrations” 
in such a way that would decrease conflict.146 However, they highlighted some significant risks and 
concerns, including Newmont’s inability to meet the locals’ high demand for jobs, resettlement 
and compensation, and the perceived “close working relationship” between the chiefs and mine 
officers.147 They also noted the potential for community concerns to be amplified through national or 
international attention, or for resistance around mining in general to lead to local protest.
In 2010, the World Bank published a study that helped to bring international attention to the 
Ahafo BAs. This seems to be largely BAsed on observations and insights that were shared with the 
researchers by the Newmont representatives. It describes a number of “lessons learnt,”148 includ-
ing the following: (1) to work in partnership with, and not replace, local governance systems and 
government, such as consultation and decision-making through the Forum; (2) though participatory 
allocation of development funding was good, it neglected social development projects and focused 
on infrastructure spending; (3) stakeholder capacity building was crucial for free, prior, and informed 
consent but awareness and capacity could have been raised further; (4) the role of the moderator 
is important in getting through unsustainable or impractical outcomes; (5) protests that could have 
delayed construction were handled by the grievance management system. It cited Newmont repre-
sentatives who argued for the use of voluntary standards as opposed to mandatory community 
development agreement standards, which could “create a ‘lowest common denominator’ system 
where the mining sector performed only to the bare minimum required.”149
At least two reviews of NADeF have been undertaken, one by a Ghanaian consultancy, Community 
Empowerment Associates (CEA), and another by a group of Newmont employees.150 CEA found a 
number of positive findings, including NADeF’s participatory governance and management structure, 
the reliability of funds transfer as specified in the agreement, the fair and verifiable disbursement 
to communities, the relevance of the investments, and the handing over of the capital projects to 
the local District Assembly.151 However, it also found a number of areas for improvement, including 
stakeholders who were unfamiliar with the governance structures of NADeF and in general need of 
further human resource development, limited cooperation in projects across communities, delayed 
project submission and approval, and poor government support to NADeF initiatives. The authors 
found it hard to evaluate the overall impact since baseline data had not been collected along the six 
focus areas.152
Newmont employees Danso et al. noted, citing an earlier unpublished study by one of the authors, 
that the community had high levels of acceptance of the mining project in 2010, with 93% of people 
welcoming development.153 However, they found that the community may have had unrealistic 
expectations such as universal employment for local workers, that unskilled people would be 
trained, and that local businesses and labour would be preferentially contracted and hired. Resi-
dents justified these high expectations reasoning that the community bears the costs of mining, that 
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corporations owe it to society to have a CSR strategyß, and that they perceived that the community 
has some ownership over mineral resources. The researchers suggest that the community saw 
Newmont as a surrogate or de facto government. The accomplishments of NADeF described in the 
study were around the successful delivery of development projects. In terms of challenges, beyond 
the conclusions of CEA, the authors found discord between the NADeF Board of Trustees and the 
Forum, capacity constraints by the local District Assemblies, and the non-performance of SDCs.154
4.2 INDEPENDENT FINDINGS
The Ahafo BAs have also been examined, usually peripherally, as part of a handful of independent 
studies looking into different aspects of company-community relations. 
NGGL has faced a number of challenges since the Ahafo mine’s inception. First, the mining project 
likely involves the displacement of an estimated 20,000 community members—mostly subsistence 
farmers with uncertain and incomplete land replacement and/or livelihood assistance.155 The 
completed southern phase of the mine has already required resettlement of 1,700 households, 
totalling 9,575 people,156 and an additional 10,000 people are expected to be displaced by the 
planned Ahafo North phase,157 if constructed. Second, concerns over land expropriation, water 
rights, and environmental contamination have resulted in many community protests opposing 
the mine.158 Third, there are insufficient property rights protections in Ghana.159 In terms of net 
impact, Ghanaian researchers Lawson and Bentil surveyed two communities affected by the Ahafo 
mine (and BAs) and found that self-reported satisfaction with public service as well as income and 
appraisal of the economic situation had, if anything, gotten worse since the mine’s inception in 
2006.160
While the BAs are largely silent on the issues of resettlement and compensation, these have been 
critical issues affecting company-community relations. According to Mares, it was debateable 
whether expropriation of land during Newmont’s initial period was conducted in accordance with 
Ghana’s State Lands Act of 1962, and the “constitutional principle of prompt, fair, and adequate 
compensation was questionably applied in this context.”161 For much of the land transferred to the 
mining company, community members only received compensation for crops and buildings, rather 
than receiving compensation for the value of all land held, including fallow land.162 When construc-
tion of the first phase of the mine began, Newmont was criticized for inadequately compensating 
displaced people; Newmont, instead, followed national law, which was regarded as insufficient, as 
well as precedents set by other companies.163 This practice was below Newmont’s own CSR stan-
dards.164 In the end, the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation (IFC)’s $125 million loan to 
Newmont in 2006 led to an improved compensation scheme,165 and the devastation caused by the 
inadequate level of mandated compensation may have prompted NGGL to negotiate BAs with the 
Ahafo communities.166 
Henisz described the relationship between Newmont and local communities as not positive during 
the development of the Ahafo South concession. Community members felt that police were 
using unwarranted force and arrest; there were environmental impacts from an accidental waste 
discharge in 2006; and there were several allegations, including that the mine had resulted in 
increasing malaria and that NGGL was misallocating jobs and favouring chiefs and their allies for 
work contracts and benefits. 167
The challenges of the Ahafo context have had further effects beyond the issue of compensation. 
The Ahafo communities considered Newmont as a surrogate government, according to Lawson 
and Bentil.168 Arce and Miller note that while some groups do protest the Ahafo mine because of 
its environmental impacts—including the cyanide spill of October 2009169—those Ahafo community 
members who are benefiting from the mine are not opposed to the mine or protesting for closure 
but are rather raising grievances concerning the need for better use of finances, respect for rights, 
and distribution of services.170 This is in contrast to many Latin American contexts, where protests 
have galvanized into strong anti-mining movements.
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Also peripheral to the Ahafo BAs is implementation issues surrounding Ghana’s Mineral Develop-
ment Fund, which is the percentageof royalties earmarked for community development. Dupuy 
found that corruption, lack of accountability and transparency, and a lack of monitoring and 
evaluation have resulted in those royalties having a sub-optimal impact.171 Chiefs, who are allocated 
25% of the funds, are viewed with much deference in Ghana, and so they are often not challenged 
regarding decisions concerning the use of funds.172 This issue of the potential for local elites to 
benefit disproportionately would come up in many of our conversations.
4.3 RECOGNITION AND AWARDS
Despite the range of community grievances noted by researchers, the Ahafo project has led to 
Newmont and NGGL winning recognition and numerous awards relating to environmental and 
corporate social responsibility. 
In 2014, NADeF was awarded the best social impact investment vehicle in Africa by the European 
Union’s African Chamber of Commerce in 2014.173 In 2015, the Ahafo mine was recognized as the 
mining company of the year by the Ghana Chamber of Commerce.174 Most recently, in 2017, the 
National Philanthropy Forum recognized NADeF as the Corporate Foundation Philanthropist of the 
Year at Ghana’s 2017 National Philanthropy Excellence Awards. The purpose of the award was to 
recognize “the long-standing contribution of NADeF toward improving lives and supporting sustain-
able socio-economic development in the communities neighbouring the Ahafo mine.”175 
In the 2017 Corporate Responsibility magazine, Newmont was the highest-ranked natural resource 
extraction company, at 43rd (down from 16th place in 2010). In 2007, the firm had been the first 
gold company to join the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index,176 which covers the top 10% of the 
2500 largest companies in the Dow Jones total stock market index in terms of “economic, environ-
mental, and social factors.”177
27 IMPLEMENTING THE AHAFO BENEFIT AGREEMENTS: SEEKING MEANINGFUL 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AT NEWMONT’S AHAFO GOLD MINE IN GHANA
5. METHODS
The methods used in this research reflect the primary purpose of this report: to study the imple-
mentation of the Ahafo BAs with a focus on what aspects can be improved to enhance outcomes for 
community members. 
Our method of inquiry is a single case study, which allows us to get a “holistic” view of the different 
aspects at work in the Ahafo BAs.178 Thus we sought a comprehensive perspective from all sources 
available, including previous research, news articles, company reports, data analysis, and individual 
and group interviews conducted in the field with community members, representatives from 
traditional authorities, the company, and local and national government. This study qualitatively 
weighted the perspective of the affected communities over other stakeholders. This means that, 
though the authors spoke to stakeholders with a wide range of perspectives, the primary viewpoints 
of interest are those of the community. Stakeholders other than community members were inter-
viewed not only to get their unique perspectives but also to triangulate the primary issues raised 
by the community members. Other weightings might have favoured different constituencies, and 
therefore would have embedded the research in a different objective function. For example, if we 
were to over-weigh the views of the mining company, the implicit objective function of the BAs 
would be “How can I minimize disruption to the mining activity at the lowest cost?” and if we were to 
over-weigh the views of the national government, the objective function might have been “How can I 
maximize an equitable contribution to national GDP from a disruptive but promising local economic 
activity?” We think both of these framings are extremely valuable, and indeed it is a strength of the 
BA approach in itself to balance these different perspectives, but it is beyond the scope of this report 
to tackle all three perspectives. 
For those readers of this report who are not members of the affected communities themselves, 
but rather who are seeking to learn from the Ahafo experience, we note that the Ahafo BAs may 
constitute a “critical case” for studying implementation of community benefit agreements. The Ahafo 
BAs have a number of advantages for serving as a critical case, which would allow some deductions 
or generalizability to be inferred from the findings.179 First, as noted earlier, it is considered “best 
practice” for international BAs in low- and middle-income countries, with Newmont having earned 
substantial accolades for its work with communities including in Ghana, and so to the extent that we 
find challenges here they are likely to be found elsewhere. Thus, we will learn from, and scrutinize, 
an environment that is regarded as being on the forefront of leading practices, which will give us a 
greater chance of learning new insights. Second, there is a relative abundance of material already 
written about Ahafo, so the existing study can be put into that broader set of findings, and our 
observations—conducted during a brief window of time during the Ahafo BAs’ implementation—can 
draw from that history of study and data collection.
Our methodology will not allow us to determine causality between the Ahafo BAs and sustainable 
development outcomes in the affected area. As CEA noted, since there are no BAseline data for the 
BAs, let alone for a “control” set of households (not affected by the BAs and therefore able to serve 
as an indication on the “counterfactual” outcomes in a world without the BAs), it is challenging to 
measure the success of the BAs themselves.180 Thus we are limited to being able to identify candi-
date areas or processes for improvement. This may leave the impression that the paper is inherently 
critical of the implementation of the BAs, which we try to balance, but that is because we are 
constrained in our methodology given the lack of any BAseline data that can allow for any meaning-
ful overall evaluation. A related CIRDI project is investigating monitoring and evaluation in BAs with 
the goal of giving communities and companies guidance on how to collect data both to manage the 
implementation of, and evaluate, BAs. 
Before conducting interviews, two members of the study team completed a scoping visit to the 
Ahafo region to determine interest in a wider study. During this visit, we found broad-BAsed support 
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from the community to the national level. Following the scoping visit, we developed a semi-struc-
tured interview protocol and reviewed all of the information on the Ahafo BAs that we could find. 
The field research itself occurred in the second half of May 2017. There were two field teams, one 
of which had a female team member. Each team had a community research manager (community 
members not employed by the mine) to assist with translation for those researchers who did not 
speak Twi. A total of 109 people were interviewed, with interviews being conducted in both English 
and Twi. Of those interviewed, 72 interviewees were men and 37 were women; this gender imbal-
ance, while unfortunate, is reflective of gender ratios among those holding leadership positions in 
the Ahafo context. As recommended by other researchers with experience working in this jurisdic-
tion, interviews were documented using hand-written notes, and without making any audio or video 
recordings.
Interviews were conducted in the Asutifi North District, the Tano North District, and in Accra. The 
interviews were done in every officially affected community, as well as the neighbouring commu-
nities of Hwidiem, which is affected by the Ahafo Mine but does not have status in the BAs, and 
Sunyani. People interviewed include chiefs, sub-chiefs, elders, queen mothers, members of commu-
nities covered by the Ahafo Mine BAs, members of communities not covered by the Ahafo BAs, 
government representatives, District Assemblymen, NGGL and Newmont employees, members of 
civil society and NGOs, development agencies involved with Ahafo BA implementation, Resettlement 
Negotiation Committee members, Sustainable Development Committee members, male and female 
farmers, youth representatives, community members with disabilities, district planning officers, 
NADeF members, and Forum members. In addition, group interviews were conducted in the offi-
cially affected communities of Terchire, Afrisipakrom, Adrobaa, and Ntotroso. 
Finally, interview results were verified with community stakeholders, then analyzed. After all 
interview data had been collected, a qualitative interpretive analysis was done. The researchers, 
in tandem with the community-BAsed research managers, identified fourteen insights, which are 
organized to answer three general questions, the first two of which we formulated before the field 
research was undertaken, found below. The results were interpreted as answers to these questions 
and, using this interpretation, the researchers identified topics for discussion for the 2018 review of 
the Ahafo BAs, as well as topics for new BAs in Ghana and elsewhere.
One, how do community members (and the government, the company, and other actors) regard the 
Ahafo BAs’ performance and implementation, with respect to, among other topics, performance on 
the terms of the agreement, representation and participation, process and administration including 
grievance mechanisms, effective use of funds, adaptability to unforeseen issues, and communica-
tion? This was analyzed in two ways. First, the researchers looked at the general performance of the 
BAs as a whole. Second, the researchers looked at the performance of each of the three agreements 
individually. 
Two, what are the challenges and barriers that have been experienced with regards to the Ahafo 
BAs’ implementation and performance, and how did these arise? We sought to put the challenges 
into a richer context so as to be able to better understand the root causes and thus suggest poten-
tially more helpful solutions.
In addition to these two main questions, we sought to explore how company-community relations 
were doing outside of the scope of the BAs. Early on in the fieldwork, we recognized that the BAs 
constituted just a formalized subset of company-community relations in the Ahafo context, and 
we did not want to be restricted to just this window in interpreting how the BAs were working. The 
analysis for this question includes exploring CSR activity, such as the Ahafo Linkages program, and 
mitigation strategies, that are not included in the BAs.
Regarding ethics and sensitive information, all research conducted for this report was done in 
accordance with Simon Fraser University’s Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, the TCPS-
2. As mentioned above, interviews were carefully selected to include differing perspectives on the 
Ahafo BAs. To assure uninhibited responses and accurate information, interviewees were assured 
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of confidentiality. As a result, there is no attribution of information to individuals and the interview 
list is confidential. Excerpts of the report’s factual findings were shared with community leaders and 
Newmont for feedback before publication. In addition, a draft of the report was shared with subject 
matter experts around the world. That said, none of those groups retained any editorial control over 
the final version.
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6. AHAFO PERSPECTIVES
In this section we describe the findings from the field visit to Ahafo, which are derived from individ-
ual and group interviews as well as subsequent feedback and material provided from Newmont and 
community leaders. We split the findings into five sub-sections. First, we explore the perspectives 
around the negotiation and renegotiation of the Ahafo BAs. Second, in the process of coding the 
entire set of interview data, we identified a number of insights that do not apply to any particular 
agreement, but instead to all of them or their collective implementation. In the second subsection 
we collect those insights. Finally, in the third through fifth subsections we describe findings related 
to the relationship, employment, and development foundation agreements respectively. We refrain 
from making recommendations until section 8.
6.1 NEGOTIATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF THE AHAFO BENE-
FIT AGREEMENTS
Understanding the negotiation process for the original agreements from 2008 and the revised 
agreements of 2014 can inform the study of their implementation. Negotiations involve the media-
tion of different parties’ points of view and priorities, and often result in unexpected compromises 
and concessions. For instance, lowering the local employment target in the 2014 EA was a source of 
grievance for most community members interviewed; this makes understanding the renegotiations 
especially important. Since we did not find any documented community perspectives on the negoti-
ation of the Ahafo BAs, we interviewed various stakeholders about the negotiations during our visit. 
Moreover, our recommendations concerning the BAs should be considered taking into account how 
they might be renegotiated in practice. According to NGGL, negotiations for the next version of the 
BAs are scheduled for 2019.
As explained by representatives of NGGL, discussions between Newmont and various chiefs of the 
mining communities began in 2005, before mining operations began in 2006. The Social Responsi-
bility Forum was also established in 2006, two years before it was formally established by the SRA. 
Various NGGL representatives say that the BAs were the result of demands by the chiefs for the 
company to do more for the communities than what was required by domestic law.
The moderator of the Forum led the negotiation of the BAs between 2006 and 2008. These negotia-
tions were conducted in Twi.
6.1.1 Objectives of the Ahafo BAs 
The 2008 agreements set out objectives that include contributing to the communities’ social and 
economic development,181 ensuring that the local communities benefit from the mining opera-
tions,182 and meeting community concerns regarding the lack of employment in the local communi-
ty.183
Multiple community interviewees recalled that employment creation was a key concern of those 
community members who were aware of, or participating in, the negotiations. One community 
representative and former Forum member noted that community members and representatives 
who were involved in the negotiations of the Ahafo BAs had a strong focus on this objective and, 
as a result, ignored or paid comparably less attention to other critical issues including the potential 
for indirect employment creation and business opportunities, and the need to protect against the 
mine’s potential adverse impacts on the environment. The community’s narrative was, in effect, 
“land for jobs.” On the other hand, according to both NGGL representatives and one community 
member interviewed, the CEO of Newmont is said to have initiated the notion of the $1/oz royalty 
and 1% of net profit transfer to the community.
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6.1.2 Challenges to a Fair Deal During the Negotiations 
Some community members were happy with the negotiation process, noting that the deals signed 
were the result of a “shared process” and that particular constituencies, such as the youth, were 
represented. Yet interviewees suggested several broad challenges to ensuring the equal, mean-
ingful participation of community representatives during the negotiations of the 2008 and 2014 
agreements. Although they were brought up separately during the discussion of the negotiation and 
renegotiation, these challenges are BAsically deficiencies relating to the functioning of the Forum 
and the Ahafo BAs more broadly, and they reappear in that context later in the report.
First, the Forum’s Standing Committee was described as taking a dominant role in negotiations. 
Forum members were present for the negotiations, although one member of the Forum remem-
bered that the Standing Committee would drive negotiations in the absence of other Forum 
members, and then present proposals for agreement at Forum meetings. Most of these proposals 
were accepted by the Forum. According to one former Forum member, little opportunity was 
allowed for other members of the Forum to contribute to the negotiations.
Second, the Forum’s moderator allegedly did not always allow opportunities for different community 
representatives to contribute to the negotiations. One member of the Forum at the time of negoti-
ations recalled that the moderator acted as an authoritative figure during negotiations and during 
Forum meetings more generally. The moderator was regarded as having relevant technical skills 
and knowledge. However, according to two former members of the Forum, the moderator did not 
always make this expertise available to participating community members, often ignored the views 
of “ordinary” community members (i.e. community members other than chiefs) participating at the 
Forum and was at times perceived to be on the side of Newmont.
Third, there was some intra- and inter-community tension that prevented full participation. One 
Forum member saw NGGL’s engagement as being focused on chiefs and other community power 
brokers, effectively ignoring grassroots perspectives. The member described this using a local 
proverb: “when you cut the head off a snake, all that is left is the rope.” This was explained to mean that 
the interviewee viewed Newmont’s engagement with community leaders as a strategy to silence the 
majority and greatly reduce the number of community interests needing to be satisfied before an 
agreement could be concluded. As discussed below, one member of the Forum at the time of negoti-
ations recalled that the lawyers provided by NGGL only assisted the chiefs, leaving other community 
representatives to their own devices. Existing power relationships could exacerbate this challenge 
at the negotiations. The same former member of the Forum recalled that chiefs participating in the 
negotiations tended to dominate the other community representatives. For example, when commu-
nity representatives pushed for compensation for more than just houses and crops, they were told 
by the chiefs that the land belonged to the chiefs, not the community members. Members of one 
community also noted that negotiating one agreement between ten different communities made it 
hard for individual communities with differing priorities to be heard, as they would have nine other 
communities to argue with. This created pressure to agree with the majority.
Fourth, community members and even community representatives themselves often expressed 
the assumption that those representing community interests during the negotiations may not 
have been adequately educated or sufficiently knowledgeable about mining and agreements to 
adequately represent community interests and understand what was being negotiated. On the 
other hand, one group of community leaders noted that there was two months of training before 
the agreement was signed. Another group of leaders was confident that those who signed the 
agreement understood what they were signing, and a third group stated they knew at least when 
the negotiations were going on.
Finally, there could have been better consultation from community representatives to their own 
constituents. Many community members who were not members of the Forum stated that they 
were not consulted by Forum members about negotiations with Newmont in the lead-up to the 
2008 and 2014 agreements. Community members not involved in the Forum or other deliberative 
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processes tended to only hear about the Ahafo BAs after they had been signed. This led to commu-
nity members being “shocked” by what was contained in the renegotiated agreements in 2014. Some 
community members were not sure if their representatives actually represented their interests 
during negotiations or not.
6.1.3 The 2014 Renegotiations
As with the 2008 negotiations, several community members thought that the 2014 agreement 
negotiations largely took place through the Standing Committee, rather than the Forum itself. The 
interviewees also noted that the agenda for renegotiation was set by the Standing Committee the 
day before Forum meetings; in practice this meant that Forum members not part of the Standing 
Committee were often not able to raise issues, and were instead merely informed as to what the 
Standing Committee had already “decided.” According to the minutes of the February 2014 Forum 
meeting to approve the amended agreements, which were shared with us by Newmont, the final 
drafts adopted by the Standing Committee from December 2013 were approved with only minor 
corrections to the names and titles of some members.184 
The renegotiation was regarded as leading to less favourable outcomes for the communities. 
Specifically the reduction of the required percentage of community citizens within the company’s 
national workforce from 35 to 24%185 was seen as being won by the company without the commu-
nity gaining anything in exchange. One interviewee noted that this reduction was conceded by the 
community even though the percentage of net profits payable to the Foundation remained at 1% of 
Newmont’s net pre-tax profit after consideration of all inter-company transactions; that interviewee 
suggested that this concession by the community may have been given because of the dominant 
role of the moderator. Community members were described as being “shocked,” “not comfortable” 
and “hav[ing] all sorts of complaints” about the reduction in percentage, which appeared to be 
the subject of widespread frustration and grievance. Dissatisfaction with lack of employment for 
community members more generally was also one of the BAses for subsequent advocacy and 
protests that took place in August 2017.186 
One local civil society organization noted that information about the negotiations in 2014 was not 
made available publicly; instead, the organization used its networks to find out about the proposed 
diminution from 35% to 24% before the 2014 agreement was signed. The organization then wrote 
to the chief of one of the communities and to district assembly members, among others, to object. 
Subsequently, according to a member of the organization, a local member of parliament did not 
attend the meeting and that particular chief refused to sign the agreement. (The version of the 2014 
Local Employment Agreement reviewed for this study features one signature by the Chief of Kenyasi 
No. 1 on behalf of all communities; four chiefs—from Yamfo, Ntotroso, Susuanso, Wamahinso—
signed as witnesses.)iv 
A representative from a local organization focused on the rights of people with disabilities noted 
that the Forum lacks anyone charged with representing the rights of people with disabilities, and 
while the local organization did not exist during the initial negotiations, the organization was opera-
tional when the renegotiations took place. To the knowledge of the organization, no one sought to 
include the perspectives of people with disabilities in the make-up of Forum members.
We reviewed the “Agreement Review Report,” shared with us by Newmont, which contains the 
recommendations from various stakeholders, the recommendations taken by the Standing 
Committee, and the decisions taken by the Forum. The document shows the Standing Committee 
balancing stakeholder demands—for example, not agreeing to a proposal to replace youth and 
farmer representatives with Members of Parliament, nor one to increase the number of NGO or 
women representatives; it even rejected a Newmont suggestion to have the Standing Committee 
manage employment and galamsey, indicating some independence from the company.187 Regarding 
iv		A	representative	from	Newmont,	responding	to	the	draft	factual	findings	for	this	report,	noted	that	the	
community members decided for themselves which individuals would be appropriate to sign the document 
on behalf of the community.
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the renegotiation of the employment target, the report indicates that many of the stakeholders 
advocated for a higher employment target, but the Standing Committee recommended, and the 
Forum agreed, that new criteria would be proposed by the moderator.188 There was also advocating 
for better employment reporting, but the Standing Committee did not agree to the suggestions.189 
A variety of proposals advocated increasing the payment formula, and the Standing Committee 
agreed to refer the proposals to the company to come back and decide.190 
Some requested amendments to the Ahafo BAs seemed to be more about ensuring political 
support and rent-seeking than the efficiency or equity of the institutions created. One request from 
Newmont to set aside some payment of the funds for an “Annual Donation to the Overlord (Otum-
fuo)” was proposed by the Standing Committee at 2% of funds, and approved by the Forum under 
the cultural heritage category of expenditure (but noted that it would not appear in the agreement 
as a clause).191 The Otumfuo is the traditional ruler of the Ashanti kingdom. Other suggestions, such 
as an “end of service package” for SDC and Forum members as proposed by SDC members, relate to 
the value of the positions set up through the Ahafo BAs.192
6.1.4 Support Available to Communities
While there was variation in community opinions regarding the availability or not of legal assistance 
for community members, the balance of opinions, including those of Newmont, was that there 
was one lawyer (or perhaps two) for the communities who were present during the signing of the 
agreements in 2008 and 2014. Interviewees from Newmont explained that the company paid for 
the community lawyer but left the decision of which lawyer to engage to the community. According 
to interviewees from both Newmont and the community, no other forms of technical experts were 
made available to the community for the purposes of the negotiation. Members of one community 
noted that the lawyer for the communities did not consult separately with representatives of each 
community, because the lawyer was tasked with representing all ten communities collectively. 
Community interviewees noted that the lawyer’s role focused on reading and explaining in Twi 
language what the draft agreement said for community representatives, rather than providing 
advice or seeking to advance the concerns or ideas of community representatives in the negotia-
tions. This was confirmed by Newmont who explained that the lawyers were brought in after agree-
ment had been reached to put the agreements in writing. Such an arrangement would likely leave 
the chiefs to fend for their own without any professional advice when negotiating the substance of 
the BAs; this would fall far short of international best practices, which underline the importance of 
communities being adequately informed and equipped with the necessary expertise to negotiate 
benefit agreements with private sector actors.193
One community representative at the Forum at the time of the negotiations recalled that the lawyers 
were not introduced to, and did not confer with or advise, community representatives at the Forum 
other than the chiefs, though a Newmont representative noted that “[t]he lawyer provided the 
interpretation service at the Forum[,] where all members including community representatives were 
supposed to benefit from his services.” If true, this imbalance in access to legal assistance between 
the chiefs and all other community representatives at the Forum would have undermined efforts to 
increase participation and access by non-dominant community groups, such as women and youth. 
This imbalance is also reflected in the fact that the 2014 EA and RA are signed by one chief presum-
ably on behalf of all ten communities, and witnessed by four more chiefs, but are not signed by any 
other community representative participating in the Forum.
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6.2 GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AHAFO BAs
This section describes the implementation experience of the Ahafo BAs that are common across the 
different agreements or related to the collective project.
6.2.1 Varying Experiences of Communities 
The Ahafo BAs, and the mine’s operations more broadly, affect and involve a range of different 
communities, who have different characteristics and priorities, and who experience the impacts 
from the mine and the BAs in different ways. 
Interviewees from communities located within the active Ahafo South mine area shared first-hand 
accounts of adverse environmental and social impacts of the mine, but also of opportunities 
deriving from the mine (including local employment and NADeF projects). Members of one satellite 
community, located some distance from the community town with which it is formally attached, 
described bearing the brunt of the nearby mine’s environmental impacts, including potential or 
actual disruptions to their access to water, food, education, and other essential services, while 
having less exposure to potential benefits offered under the BAs due to their geographic isolation. 
In addition, members of one community argued that its members should be entitled to more, or 
at least an equal share of, jobs at the underground mine, given that it had born the majority of the 
social and environmental impacts from the existing mining operations, which include impacts on 
local farming practices and livelihoods. They also considered that northern communities who had 
not yet experienced significant impacts to be less entitled to the opportunities the BAs offered for 
the same reason. According to the minutes of the February 2014 Forum meeting, the Ahafo South 
chiefs “raised the issue about the stopping the Ahafo North Communities from receiving funds from 
the NADeF.”194
Members of northern communities, on the other hand, tended to discuss their anticipation of the 
mining activities in the future. One community leader from the North was satisfied with the imple-
mentation performance of the BAs, noting that the community’s expectations were being met. Many 
interviewees were impatient for the mine activities to reach them, in part because they perceived 
mining activities as bringing increased opportunities for employment and economic stimulation, and 
believed that community members in the South had greater access to these opportunities thus far. 
Other community members located in the North perceived community members in the South as 
having greater access to mine-related jobs because there are more people in the South who have 
already undergone training.
Another set of communities not mentioned in the BAs, and thus less well positioned to seize oppor-
tunities afforded under the agreements, are those located just outside the concession area, but who 
are still affected by the mine. One prominent example is Hwidiem, a community town located near 
Kenyasi No. 2, which unsuccessfully sought to be included in the BAs at their inception, and whose 
community members accordingly could not access NADeF projects or preferential employment. One 
interviewee, BAsed in Hwidiem, lamented that the town experienced some of the negative impacts 
of mining—including increased population due to an influx of people seeking mine-related employ-
ment and proximity to environmental damage—but without receiving any positive opportunities 
under the BAs.
6.2.2 Varying Experiences Within Communities
Different segments of the communities also expressed different levels of satisfaction with the 
performance of the Ahafo BAs. Not surprisingly, individuals who personally or professionally 
benefitted from the BAs tended to be more satisfied. Chiefs and other opinion leaders participating 
in different decision-making processes set out in the BAs tended to be pleased with them, while 
also voicing concerns or suggestions for improvement. Contractors of the mine also saw the BAs as 
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working well, even if they had concerns about the operation of procurement processes. Members 
of one community stakeholder interest group felt financially supported to shift the focus of their 
organization to one that better corresponded to their needs, and generally felt content with the 
operation of the BAs, despite noting that less than half of their articulated concerns were articulated 
by that stakeholder group’s representatives at the Forum. In addition, those community members 
who had financially benefitted from the company’s CSR interventions also tended to view the BAs 
(and the presence of the mine more generally) in a more favourable light.
On the other hand, those who felt ignored or marginalized by the processes were less satisfied with 
the BAs. A representative of people with disabilities felt that their perspective was excluded from the 
Forum and other deliberative spaces and felt accordingly dissatisfied by the operation of the Ahafo 
BAs. Community members, especially those who had been resettled, those whose wishes to be 
resettled were ignored, and those located in less visible satellite communities or outside of the mine 
area were dissatisfied with the BAs. These community members generally considered it unlikely that 
such agreements would lead to better outcomes for them. Chiefs in one town felt frustrated by the 
company’s failure to recognize them as the legitimate representatives following a leadership dispute, 
and failure to grant them access to the Forum. (Newmont noted this dispute is before the courts 
and they were waiting for the outcome.) One community member also thought that the BAs were 
“really not working” because benefits like scholarships seemed to be less prevalent now than at the 
beginning of the mine. Representatives from the District Assembly also had concerns, lamenting the 
lack of coordination between SDCs and the District Assembly needed to ensure coherence between 
NADeF-funded development projects with the District Assembly’s local development plans.
6.2.3 Community Awareness of the Ahafo BAs
The study team observed varying degrees of understanding among community members regard-
ing the BAs. No interviewees—including chiefs, opinion leaders, and other community members 
participating in processes established by the BAs—said that they had actually read the BAs. (The 
one segment of the community that had previously paid close attention to the BAs’ contents was 
the chiefs who had been present at the negotiations, who had the BAs explained to them by the 
lawyer.) Chiefs from several communities acknowledged that they owned copies of the BAs but had 
not actually read them; some chiefs and opinion leaders explicitly noted that they had a low level of 
understanding of the BAs. 
Interviews with community members not involved in any of the BAs’ processes demonstrated a far 
lower level of familiarity with the BAs. Interviewees from three different communities had not heard 
of the BAs at all, and some interviewees had not heard of the Forum or the SDCs. One interviewee 
described the BAs as being between the chiefs and Newmont, and therefore not concerning the 
majority of community members. 
6.2.4 Information Sharing and Communication
The BAs establish many committees and processes that are designed to enhance communication 
between the communities and NGGL. Despite these initiatives, the majority of interviewees who 
spoke about community-company information sharing and communication expressed dissatisfac-
tion. In describing their reasons for this, community members alleged that information about discus-
sions at the Forum is not consistently made available to community members who do not directly 
participate, and that community queries to NGGL about issues like local employment numbers 
are sometimes handled in an unhelpful way. One interviewee noted that Newmont’s responses to 
such queries are not “satisfying” and often involve asking the community for evidence, when such 
evidence may only be accessible by Newmont, such as for break-downs of local employment data. 
Another noted that requests for information regarding local employment took a year before NGGL 
provided the relevant data. (A Newmont representative stated that the process was a Forum-led 
validation exercise with quarterly updates.) Another interviewee noted that Newmont information 
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offices were not a reliable means of communicating with the company. Although located in each 
community town, they were not always open and did not have the information sought by commu-
nity members.
Representatives from NGGL also noted that it is difficult to reach the grass roots of each community, 
though highlighted the Community Consultative Committee’s work in connecting Newmont with 
community perspectives. They also confirmed that NGGL does not monitor whether Forum repre-
sentatives are meaningfully consulting within their community. Finally, the company representatives 
noted that NGGL’s presence in the communities has reduced over time, with community relations 
staff being reduced from 140 to 40 over a six-year period. 
6.2.5 Barriers to Articulating Grievances 
Meaningful participation also requires the absence of pressure and intimidation, with community 
members having the confidence to freely communicate both their priorities and their grievances. 
Several community members described barriers to community members articulating their griev-
ances in practice. These, whether or not founded on legitimate apprehensions, included that 
avenues for complaints were closely affiliated with Newmont and with chiefs, such as the Forum, or 
the Complaints Resolution Committee, whose process requires that any complaints from a commu-
nity town must be lodged via the chief/Omanhene of that town.195 Complaining would therefore earn 
a person the reputation of being someone “who talk[s] too much.” For instance, a Forum member 
who raised concerns about the Forum’s governance and compliance with the Relationship Agree-
ment said he is now seen as a “bad boy.” Newmont representatives noted that they have a separate 
complaints and grievances mechanism with public reporting.
Those who are reliant on the mine for employment are reluctant to draw attention to themselves for 
fear that they will lose their position. One interviewee asked rhetorically, “Why would they open their 
mouth? If they did it would be shut up.” One employee of a contractor to NGGL was allegedly told by 
their employer to choose between working for the contractor and speaking out about community 
grievances with the mine. (Newmont representatives noted that their code of conduct prescribes 
sanctions against anyone who prevents someone from speaking up.) Similarly, community members 
who aspire to benefit from Newmont’s operations—or have their family members benefit—are also 
reluctant to raise legitimate grievances; for instance, one community member expressed detailed 
grievances regarding how he was compensated as part of the resettlement process before noting 
that he had stopped pursuing the resolution of the grievance because “I don’t want to destroy my 
children’s future.”
6.2.6 Barriers to Meaningful Community Participation
The BAs create various entities and processes to encourage participation by members of the 
communities in decision-making regarding the allocation of benefits, and to communicate with the 
company. For example, the Forum, in addition to having two traditional authority representatives 
from each town also has six representatives of “women groups,” ten for youth, two for non-govern-
mental organizations, and two for “farmers representatives.” 
These participatory entities and processes offer the potential for increased involvement by different 
segments within the communities, though much comes down to how differing levels of experience, 
education, language skills, and other sources of inter-personal power and influence are resolved 
during interactions. What may appear as a process weighted heavily towards ensuring opportunities 
for community members to contribute to decision-making may turn out to be the opposite if such 
power relations make it difficult in practice for different actors to advance the interests of the people 
they are charged with representing.
Many interviewees shared accounts of power imbalances undermining the ability of the BAs to 
facilitate meaningful community participation. Three examples are highlighted below.
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The first example is Sustainable Development Committees (SDCs), which are the community-BAsed 
committees that are supposed to decide how to spend NADeF funds after consulting with their 
constituents. In practice, there was a strong perception that some of the SDCs were often either 
unable or unwilling to adequately consult with community members, and instead chose projects for 
NADeF funding themselves—despite the apparent requirement that SDCs submit attendance sheets 
of community members present at meetings along with projects for approval. Some interviewees 
noted that youth representatives are often silenced by chiefs at SDC meetings. Other interview-
ees noted that community members might have more luck holding the attention of their SDC if 
Newmont representatives were present at meetings between the SDC and the community, suggest-
ing the accountability of the SDC is to NGGL rather than to the community. NADeF has decided that 
in the future, staff will sit in on community meetings to ensure they are following the provisions in 
the DFA.
A second example is the Forum. The Forum’s structure included representatives from different 
segments of the community but in practice was perceived as being dominated by the moderator 
and the Standing Committee, which regularly set the agenda of meetings. In addition, the presence 
of chiefs could be problematic. On the one hand, chiefs were regarded as too powerful for other 
participating community members to contradict; on the other, some chiefs lacked the language 
skills or confidence to organize collectively and resist proposals that were not in the interests of 
the community. Youth representatives participating at the Forum, among other entities, also often 
felt silenced or powerless when seeking to advocate for greater information sharing with, or other 
opportunities for, youth; this further entrenched the perception that such processes did not always 
create spaces for participation by different groups. Community members not participating at the 
Forum also felt that Forum members did not regularly update communities regarding what occurred 
at each meeting; this made it harder for them to have their perspectives represented at Forum 
meetings.
A third example is the community citizen validation process under the EA. This process was designed 
to ensure that jobs reserved for community members were not allocated to outsiders. Yet commu-
nity members interviewed often believed that such jobs were regularly allocated to outsiders, and 
that chiefs self-interestedly used this process as another leverage point for personal gain, rather 
than allowing the process to achieve its aim.
In each example, the challenges to ensuring that community members can participate in and influ-
ence these entities and processes lie, at least in part, in the dynamics within the communities them-
selves. Newmont is thus perceived as trying its best to encourage participation but being stymied 
by local dynamics outside of its control, including powerful, self-interested chiefs. One community 
member considered the problem to be tied to the fact that chiefs and opinion leaders are too 
powerful, and often do not represent the broader interests of the community. Another noted that 
the chiefs derive influence from their formal ownership of stool lands. They were thus described as 
facing a conflict of interest between their formal role in representing the community (which should 
include ensuring the equitable disbursement of benefits, such as contracting work, among commu-
nity members) and their de facto incentive to seek to benefit personally. One community member 
summed this up by saying, “if you are a chief, [you should] do chief work, not contractor work”. 
Other community members echoed this sentiment, noting that the stream of benefits had shifted 
from being “for the community” to being “for the individual.”
Other challenges stem from community perceptions regarding the neutrality of entities and 
processes established by the BAs. Various committees were regarded as being “sponsored,” by 
Newmont, and featuring chairs aligned with the company. One group of interviewees also viewed 
NADeF as a partner of the company rather than the community. One interviewee, musing on these 
challenges, proposed that such entities be funded by external parties, such as bilateral donors, to 
avoid a situation where the company, as the one source of funding, has “greater control over who 
should be the leader of the house.”
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These entities and processes have created a formalized buffer between challenges linked to power 
dynamics within the community, on the one hand, and Newmont, on the other. The unfortunate 
result is that Newmont appears to be acting responsibly by encouraging participation, but commu-
nity members themselves are often unable to meaningfully participate in key decisions. Local 
powerbrokers exploit the gap.
6.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP AGREEMENT
Here we review findings regarding the implementation of the Relationship Agreement (RA) (and, 
before 2014, the Social Responsibility Agreement or SRA). The primary facts around the RA have 
already been mentioned in section 3.2.1, above. A stated aim of the RA is “to provide the Commu-
nity with the opportunity to participate in the Company’s decisions and plans that may affect the 
Community and its environs.”196 This is bolstered by the agreement’s cardinal principles, which refer 
to consultations, openness and the sharing of information.197 These aims resemble an evolving set 
of international norms concerning the human rights of community members affected by large-scale 
resource projects to participate in decision-making regarding projects that affect them. These norms 
include the right to information198 and the right to participate in public affairs,199 which may also 
include entitlements for project affected communities to be consulted and to effectively influence 
public decision-making processes regarding resource projects that affect them.200 
6.3.1 The Forum as a Multi-Stakeholder Body
The Forum’s structure provides for the representation of many different stakeholders, and different 
segments of the community, such as women and youth. Yet as mentioned in section 6.2, above, 
some community members expressed frustration that, owing to local power structures and the 
contracting opportunities of the mine, chiefs had too much relative influence on the Forum and 
were not incentivized to represent the interests of other community members as a whole. One 
member of the Forum questioned the capacity of some participating chiefs to even follow and 
understand the substance of discussions at the Forum.
Various community members also expressed concern regarding alleged inadequate consultation 
practices of Forum members. Community members were concerned that they are generally not 
consulted regarding specific issues that will be discussed at Forum meetings. Forum members were 
also perceived as not faithfully conveying what happens at Forum meetings back to community 
members. Representatives from NGGL also suspected this was the case and expressed concern. 
One community member suggested that Newmont could apply more pressure on Forum members 
or community representatives to consult with community members before signing anything on their 
behalf.
Some community meetings and consultations do occur. Yet one interviewee noted that community 
members are not motivated to attend community meetings or consultations because they expect 
that the issues they raise with community leaders will not be conveyed to the Forum. There is a lack 
of clear information about deliberations at the Forum made available to community members not 
directly involved, with different Forum members providing information to community members in 
different ways, and with varying degrees of balance or accuracy. One Forum representative also 
noted the need for funds for logistical support with community consultations (their requests to 
Newmont for financial support to facilitate this had not been met).
Certain segments of the communities were especially un- or under-represented. First, the Forum 
lacks anyone charged with representing the rights of people with disabilities. Requests for the inclu-
sion of the perspectives of people with disabilities, and for support to establish independent offices 
to enable the group to more effectively advocate on behalf of its members, were either rejected or 
referred to NADeF. Second, less than one third of Forum members are women. While this may echo 
the over-representation of men in leadership roles in the communities more generally (and indeed 
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in our interview sample), it still undermines the representation of women’s perspectives. Third, 
barriers also existed in the representation of youth perspectives. Some of the youth representatives 
appeared to be much older than the age bracket they were charged with representing, indicating 
the potential for a dissonance between the concerns youth have and those noted at the Forum. On 
the other hand, youth representatives from one community had a different opinion: they considered 
that the RA was going well, but saw the operation of the EA as having problems.
6.3.2 Representation versus Delegation
In any setting, getting substantive progress with a deliberative body of over 50 members is hard 
work. Some degree of delegation must usually be carried out; this is the case even for parliamentary 
committees in Canada’s legislature. At the Forum, delegation also occurs; looking at the Forum’s 
structure and according to interviews conducted, Forum members seemed to regularly delegate 
decision-making (whether formally or otherwise) to the Standing Committee and the moderator.
As we described in Section 3, above, the RA establishes a Standing Committee that is charged with 
acting on the Forum’s behalf in emergencies and performing duties assigned to it by the Forum.201 
The Standing Committee is also charged with receiving and reviewing proposals for review or 
amendment of the RA, and with making recommendations before such proposals are discussed and 
voted on.202 The Standing Committee comprises 14 people: the Forum’s moderator and co-modera-
tor, two representatives from Newmont, four Omanhene chiefs (two from each district), one youth 
representative, one women’s representative, one district chief and presiding member from each 
district (four total).203 While the earlier SRA also included two farmer representatives in the Standing 
Committee,204 this was removed in the subsequent RA.
Several interviewees regarded the Standing Committee as proactively setting the agenda for Forum 
deliberations and proposals, rather than merely receiving proposals from others and performing 
tasks on the request of the Forum. The Standing Committee was regarded as being in the practice 
of meeting in advance of Forum meetings to determine the agenda for such proposals. Interviewees 
noted that the Standing Committee would often merely inform Forum members as to what it had 
agreed on. One interviewee said that there had not been a single instance where the Standing 
Committee had brought something to the Forum that was not subsequently approved by the Forum. 
In both the Forum and the Standing Committee, the moderator emerges as an influential actor. The 
moderatorv was widely regarded by interviewees as highly qualified and playing a commanding role 
during Forum meetings. While one community interviewee described the moderator as representing 
the views of the communities well, several interviewees who had experienced interactions with the 
moderator saw him as overly dominant, and often dismissive of community concerns.
Specifically, a number of allegations were made regarding the moderator’s conduct. First, the 
moderator allegedly created an inaccessible environment, rendering it difficult for community 
representatives to participate. Forum members were often unable to follow discussions about the 
“nitty gritty” of the BAs or the law and were not supported to overcome this barrier. The moderator 
was alleged to “become so superior” and act disrespectfully because of his level of knowledge and 
experience, such that other Forum members felt intimidated and discouraged from contributing. 
Second, the moderation was perceived as unfair or biased. Some interviewees said that there had 
been meetings where the moderator shut down Forum members, or even told them they were not 
allowed to speak; in one case this was allegedly because the Forum member was affiliated with a 
civil society organization that was frowned upon by other members of the Forum. Another inter-
viewee recounted another occasion, where youth representatives were told there was not enough 
time for them to contribute to the discussion and that they should instead communicate their 
concerns to other committees. Various interviewees regarded the moderator as being too closely 
affiliated with Newmont and thus not acting impartially. One noted that despite the overwhelming 
majority of Forum members being community representatives, the Forum was weighted towards 
the interests of Newmont, who paid for the moderator and co-moderator. Another considered that 
the moderator was usually in agreement with Newmont regarding issues being discussed. Third, 
v  We contacted the moderator via email to request a formal interview but did not receive a response.
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one interviewee alleged that the moderator had privately changed draft documents after they were 
prepared by the Forum’s Standing Committee.
6.3.3 Environmental and Social Monitoring 
The RA makes provision for the company and the communities to “identify and develop” a partic-
ipatory program to monitor the mine’s environmental and social impacts.205 This is contemplated 
as an additional measure, separate from “the obligatory environmental/social impact monitoring 
programmes contained in the Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Management 
Plan of the Company”206 that NGGL is required to carry out. According to the agreement, the commu-
nities are to select at least three representatives to participate in the participatory monitoring,207 and 
NGGL is to provide training to those who will participate “so that they can understand the processes 
and be able to draw objective conclusions.”
Representatives from NGGL noted that there have been instances when community members have 
been involved in observing or reporting impacts to Newmont, including regarding noise complaints 
and galamsey activities. However, NGGL initial attempts to train community members ceased long 
ago, and a fully participatory process has not yet been implemented.vi The company noted that it is 
not currently in the practice of proactively sensitizing community members about the potential for 
such a process, but does consider community complaints and grievances regarding the impacts of 
the mine as a form of participatory monitoring. In May 2018, Newmont notified us that a community 
participatory monitoring framework is “earmarked for development in 2018 and implementation 
from 2019.”
Community interviewees generally noted that they had not heard of any participatory monitoring 
program at Ahafo but thought it would be a promising opportunity for community members, 
particularly given memories of the 2009 cyanide spill and the lack of NGGL’s clear communication 
around it at the time. One community member noted the need for sensitization so that people 
can understand what a monitoring program would involve and why it might be in their interests to 
participate. Another interviewee also noted the need for more education and sensitization as to the 
dangers of living close to a mine site more generally. Others highlighted perceptions that community 
members who monitor and highlight the mine’s adverse impacts would be viewed as unfavourable 
candidates for future jobs with NGGL or its contractors. (One interviewee noted a perception that 
for a community member who notices a problem, “when you talk about it, it will not end positively.”) 
Further feedback highlighted the need not only for training, but also for access to independent 
technical experts to help community members, given that monitoring the mine’s potential effects is 
a complex task.
6.3.4 Dispute Resolution Process 
The establishment of complaints and dispute resolution procedures is important for all stakeholders 
in the context of a large-scale mining operation. For community members, these processes provide 
avenues to communicate grievances, seek remedies, and protect their rights and interests. For the 
company, such processes are an important means of monitoring the performance of the BAs and of 
company operations more generally, can help to maintain good relations with community members, 
and, as noted in one study of the mine, can lead to significant financial savings.208 
The RA establishes a Complaints Resolution Committee for “complaints relating to the implementa-
tion” of the agreement that is closely linked to the Forum.209 The committee is staffed by the Forum’s 
co-moderator (as Chairman), and four other members of the Forum, whom the Chairman appoints 
in consultation with at least four members of the Standing Committee (two from Newmont and two 
representing the community).210
vi  In May 2018 correspondence with Newmont representatives, we learned that there is a participatory moni-
toring program on water with representatives from the District Assembly, regional Environmental Protection 
Agency, Ghana Water Resources Commission, Ghana Water Company, and community representatives.
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The agreement establishes processes for community towns, Newmont, or the District Assembly 
to lodge complaints with the Committee. It does not provide a process for individual community 
members to lodge grievances directly. For community towns, complaints are communicated to 
the committee by the chief/Omanhene of the town.211 This would mean that community members 
aggrieved by the operation of the Forum or other elements of the RA—including when such 
grievances relate to the influence or behaviour of chiefs—have no choice but to communicate 
such grievances through their chief. This could be problematic in practice: as discussed above, the 
influence and power of chiefs within the communities could create a chilling effect and discourage 
community members to raise complaints.
Representatives from NGGL spoke about dispute resolution with community members more 
generally as having three stages. First, community members can make complaints or requests 
for information at Newmont’s information offices, located in each town. Second, the Complaints 
Resolution Committee process can be invoked for relevant complaints (the company representatives 
envisioned a role for chiefs to “intervene” at this stage and assist with the resolution of complaints). 
Third, complainants could resort to a “legal process” (presumably this would involve formal litigation 
and dispute resolution using Ghana’s courts).
Despite the various grievances shared by community members interviewed, no interviewees shared 
experiences about engaging with the Complaints Resolution Committee. Given the challenges that 
even members of the Forum face in raising concerns, other community members may be reluctant 
to use this process to raise grievances, if they are even aware that it exists. One recent study also 
underlined the need for improved grievance and compliance mechanisms (albeit in the context of 
the administration of the Mineral Development Fund, rather than the operation of the Relationship 
Agreement) to ensure decision makers remain accountable.212
6.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Here we review findings regarding the implementation of the Employment Agreement (EA). The 
primary facts around the EA have already been mentioned in section 3.2.2, above. The EA was 
signed in 2008 with the key benchmark set in section 2.1 (f) of the agreement, which required a mini-
mum of 35% of the national workforce in the Ahafo Mines, including contractors, to be community 
citizens. Newmont was expected to raise the threshold to 50% within ten years of commencing gold 
production through the adoption of appropriate policy interventions.213 Given the density of small-
scale farming on the concession area, in essence the agreement was a trade of farm lands (and 
associated livelihoods) for jobs. The targets under the agreement were not met, in spite of visible 
attempts to create opportunities for community citizens. Consequently, the minimum requirement 
for local employment was lowered in the 2014 EA to 24%, with an expectation to reach 35% within 
ten years of commencing gold production; the dissatisfaction with that change is described in 
section 6.1.3, above.
6.4.1 Meeting the Target
There is acknowledgement within the community that the mine has created jobs for some people 
in the community. NGGL makes efforts to comply with the agreement by ensuring that the various 
communities get a share of the local employment opportunities. In accordance with the agreement, 
vacancies are published in the communities for qualified people to apply. The company has notice 
boards and information centers in each community to aid information sharing and to receive 
feedback and complaints. That said, some community members believed that employers were more 
interested in hiring their “own people” than employing locals.
Despite the importance of employment to the community, employment figures are generally 
unavailable online. A local official noted that jobs data are only available when attending quarterly 
presentations to the community in which PowerPoint slides are used; Newmont did not share those 
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presentations when asked.vii A number of community members believed the numbers were inflated 
as they included temporary and part-time workers. 
We asked for, and received, a copy of the Q1 2017 employment presentation; we report the data 
below (see Table 6-1). The employment figures presented by Newmont for first quarter 2017 show 
that the targets set out in the 2014 EA as well as the earlier 2008 EA have been met. According to the 
data, 41% of NGGL employees and 43% of contractors’ employees are from the local community. It 
is not clear whether these figures would hold up if they were scaled by full-time equivalent (which 
means weighting the positions by whether they are full time, part time, or seasonal). 
Table	 6-1 NGGL	Employment	Data214
Sep 2016 Dec 2016 Mar 2017
NGGL 1,029 1,041 1,049
Non-local 596 620 620
Local 433 421 429
Local % 42 40 41
Contractors 2,498 2,458 2,424
Non-local 1,488 1,307 1,389
Local 1,010 1,151 1,035
Local % 40 47 43
NGGL + Contractors 3,572 3,499 3,473
Total Non-local 2,084 1,927 2,009
Total Local 1,443 1,572 1,464
Total Local % 41 45 42
6.4.2 Dissatisfaction with Community Citizen Validation
As we described in section 3.1.2, the EA establishes a validation process through which a potential 
Ghanaian employee is deemed a “community citizen.” Specifically, the chief, Assembly member, and 
youth leader are required to validate that a person is, in fact, from the community.215
Numerous community members expressed dissatisfaction with the functioning of this vetting 
process. In some instances, leaders were accused of demanding and accepting bribes to validate as 
“community citizens” people from outside the communities. Even legitimate community members 
found themselves burdened by the process, which lent itself to corruption and favouritism. These 
accusations point to failures within traditional authority structures, arguably something that is 
outside of NGGL’s responsibility to manage. Indeed, NADeF representatives were of the opinion that 
determining who is local and who is not is ultimately up to the community.
To address such challenges, the revised EA’s process of validation has been made more transparent 
in an attempt to minimize corruption and favouritism. Section 2.5.3(ii) of the revised agreement 
states that community citizens who are shortlisted must present themselves for initial confirmation 
of their citizenship by their respective youth leader, assembly member and chief/Omanhene at a 
joint sitting in the presence of a representative of NGGL’s Human Resource Department. 
vii		Responding	to	the	draft	findings	for	this	report	in	May	2018,	Newmont	representatives	noted	that	copies	are	
distributed at meetings and, going forward, the employment statistics will be posted on community notice 
boards. 
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6.4.3 Unskilled Locals and Training for Jobs
Finding employment for unskilled community members remains a source of contention. Specifically, 
community members and Newmont disagree on the relationship between the skill level of commu-
nity members, and the training programs available to them. 
Some respondents and other local community citizens have been beneficiaries of the company’s 
training programs. According to statistics provided by NGGL, twenty-five locals were recently trained 
to become truck operators, loaders service crew, grader operators, etc. for the operation of the 
new underground mine.216 Similar trainings have also happened in the past. A community member 
acknowledged this, noting that when community members have gone through such trainings, they 
“come back as different people,” now able to earn a livelihood, for example, by driving bulldozers.
Despite these training opportunities, many community members remain dissatisfied. One commu-
nity member asserted that many locals had gone through training programs but remained unem-
ployed. In addition, two community members lamented that many locals had even benefitted from 
NADeF scholarships and had university degrees, even in relevant disciplines, but upon completion of 
their studies found that there were no jobs available.
NGGL representatives themselves noted that they initially had trouble finding community members 
with the skills needed, which explained why they were initially “unable” to meet their employment 
targets. A further complication is that the number of jobs becomes fewer later in the mine’s life, 
which may be just at the time when community members start to graduate with relevant skills. 
As such, there is a mismatch between supply of, and demand for, skilled graduates. The need for 
unskilled labour also reduces after the initial construction of the mine. One community member 
noted that the mine has been in operation for 12 years, and many community members had built up 
relevant skills and expertise, before calling on NGGL to increase the quota. Yet from the company’s 
perspective, those twelve years have been spent training up a skilled national and local workforce, 
and few vacancies now exist to offer to skilled community members.
Finally, issues were raised by community members with respect to workplace discrimination. 
Women and people with disabilities found it challenging to get jobs at Newmont, though female 
community members volunteered that most manual work jobs would go to men. In contrast, NGGL 
could point to efforts to train women to drive trucks and other technical positions. Community 
members with disabilities appeared to be especially neglected, according to a representative of 
people with disabilities.
6.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION 
AGREEMENT
In this subsection we review the performance of implementation of NADeF as experienced by the 
community stakeholders we spoke with. NADeF has been reviewed by others, as we summarized 
in section 4. In addition, we have already described project outlays in section 3.1.3 and 3.3, and in 
section 6.2 we covered the challenges of implementation regarding consultation and meaningful 
participation in NADeF. Our impression from interviews conducted aligned with the findings of 
other research. Specifically, NADeF was regarded as well known, professionally run, and successfully 
spending money on community projects and scholarships. Given these impressions, in this section 
we focus on project selection, value for money, inter-community projects, and NADeF’s funding 
formula. 
6.5.1 Project Selection
As detailed in section 3.1.3, above, NADeF spends its funds across a range of project types. In our 
discussions with community stakeholders, the most popular target for expenditure was in the 
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development of human capital through scholarships and apprenticeship training for citizens of the 
Ahafo mining communities. The process of awarding the scholarships was seen as fair and merito-
cratic by the majority of people we spoke to; the only complaints were that students risked losing 
their scholarships if they did not perform academically but would still be responsible for paying 
their school fees. One community member was also under the impression that fewer scholarships 
were awarded in recent years than at the beginning of the mine. NADeF also runs an apprenticeship 
training program. The 2016 NADeF annual report indicated 670 youth have benefited from the 
apprenticeship training programme. Some of the community members that the research team 
interviewed were direct beneficiaries of the apprenticeship programme who had established their 
own businesses.217
The Foundation funds infrastructure development and many such projects are visible in the commu-
nities. Some of those projects are of questionable development value; most communities have an 
elaborate chief’s palace, for example, that did not show evidence of extensive use, whereas commu-
nity members complained that when NADeF expenditures fell, scholarships were cut. (The funding 
formula would dictate broad cuts across the board in this situation.) In addition, as described in 
section 6.2, above, not all SDCs conducted meaningful consultations with the community before 
submitting their project proposals to NADeF. In one community, members were irate that an old 
school had been knocked down in order to make room for a sports field that didn’t have enough 
room for spectators.viii Even local government officials acknowledged that SDC members had political 
power and thus it would be difficult to go against their wishes even if the project did not appear 
wisely selected.
6.5.2 Value for Money
The process of selecting projects is complicated by the fact that the SDCs responsible for making 
recommendations to NADeF do not have information on price for the proposals. As a result, 
communities have been upset when they have chosen to do a project that they assumed would 
be a small-ticket item, only to find that it ends up costing a lot of money. One community member 
described the value for money in the following way: “If they build a door, it costs the price of a 
house.” One set of community members thought that the high costs for contracting must be due to 
corruption between NADeF and contractors; yet our discussions with the District Assembly, NADeF 
and contractors revealed what seemed to be a professional procurement operation, albeit more 
formal than the communities would need to be acting on their own.
6.5.3 Cross-Community Projects
Some of the communities are close enough to each other to plan some projects together in order 
to create greater value for the limited NADeF funds. Yet in practice no joint planning occurs, and 
two communities may end up replicating the same project. The District Assembly, NGGL, and the 
NADeF board members were all of the view that better projects could be achieved through some 
coordination between communities. Even some SDCs had ambitious plans that could not be funded 
from within their envelope, like a university or a hospital, and the Forum has discussed cross-com-
munity agribusiness projects. At present, none of this coordination is occurring, perhaps because 
the SDCs have failed to coordinate, or because the funding formula discourages it. Representatives 
from NGGL noted that at Newmont’s Akyem mine in Ghana, whose benefit sharing provisions were 
established after those at Ahafo, a common fund exists for development projects spanning more 
than a single community.
viii	Newmont’s	comments	on	the	draft	factual	findings	noted	that	NADeF	worked	hard	to	suggest	an	alternative	
location, and that the classroom block was unsafe and abandoned.
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6.5.4 The Funding Formula
The DFA specifies that the $1/oz and 1% of net pre-tax income is paid from NGGL’s operations to 
NADeF.218 Many community members were familiar with this formula and had opinions about it. 
One view was that it was simply too low. For instance, a community member pointed out that if the 
price of gold was $1350/oz, the $1/oz term would still transfer just one dollar to the communities; 
that person’s conclusion was that his leadership must not be aware of the price of gold. A second 
view was that the funding formula ought to vary by the impact and scale of the challenge. Since the 
mine had brought about population growth and the underground mining would have increased 
environmental impact, for example, the funding formula ought to be adjusted to at least keep per 
capita funding steady. A third view was that Newmont did not inform the community in sufficient 
detail on its own revenues and pre-tax income, particularly during the recent fall in contributions. 
As a result, the community was forced to take a huge decline in NADeF funding—despite a still high 
gold price—at face value.
6.6 PERFORMANCE OUTSIDE OF THE AGREEMENTS
As we described earlier, there are some aspects that are often handled in BAs in a developed-coun-
try context that are absent from the Ahafo BAs. We did not research these in depth during the field 
visit since they were outside of the agreement implementation. However, some issues—both posi-
tive and negative—were hard to ignore. In this section, we describe what we learned about supplier 
development and compensation/resettlement.
6.6.1 Developing Local Suppliers 
There are two aspects of the mine that have led to opportunities for local suppliers. One is the effort 
by NGGL to get more local firms involved in supplying the mine and mining-related activities like 
reclamation; the Ahafo Linkages Program, a two-year programme implemented in cooperation with 
the IFC, was not a requirement of the BAs yet had documented success developing local business-
es.219 The second aspect is the contracting opportunities to deliver on the NADeF projects, which are 
usually small-scale and involve community labour. 
We were not able to meet with a beneficiary of the ALP but we did speak with contractors, commu-
nity members, local officials, and NGGL representatives to discuss local supplier development and 
contracting. According to NGGL representatives, the company sets targets for local content, and 
set aside some opportunities that are just for local contractors. On its side, NADeF had a process of 
inviting qualified local companies to bid on projects, and then going through an organized procure-
ment process. A community representative volunteered that most contracts have gone to local 
contractors when they had the capacity to do the work, such as building resettlement houses or 
operating transportation services.
One contractor said that NGGL’s bidding process was the most professional, followed by NADeF’s, 
but that both of them were more fair and professional than doing projects for the local government. 
Community members were concerned that chiefs were disproportionately represented in getting 
contracting opportunities, as we described in section 6.2.6. One contractor echoed those concerns 
for NGGL, and another cited an instance in which collusion appeared to be present between the 
NADeF contracting office and the winning bid. For a different take, one contractor observed that 
contracts can make a businessperson more wealthy and influential, and they can use that wealth 
and influence to earn themselves a role as sub-chief. Thus local power and contracting could be 
correlated, but driven by this alternative mechanism.
According to the contractors, NGGL offers a more stable payment schedule for contracts, in contrast 
to what happens with government contracts. The risk burden on contractors working for NGGL and 
NADeF is therefore lessened on loans procured from banks. The banks are also more comfortable 
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and flexible in financing projects funded by NGGL, because of the reliability of payments. One 
contractor estimated a profit margin of between 15-20% of projects delivered.
6.6.2 Compensation and Resettlement
In section 4.2 we described that much of the independent research on the impact of the Ahafo mine 
on the communities has focused on issues of resettlement and compensation. While it may have 
seemed with IFC’s involvement that the issue went away, in our experience it remained a source of 
extreme distress for many affected community members. 
The study team met with villagers who were living within view and earshot of the tailings pile and 
rock crushing. These “satellite towns” belong to one of the ten communities, but represent a smaller 
hamlet of residents that are sometimes a far drive from the community center; they were truly 
unpleasant places to be living. The noise from the mine was jarring, and the waste rock had created 
huge, impassable hills of dry rock that were the highest points around. Villagers in one community 
said that they were waiting to be resettled like their neighbouring communities already had been, 
but they had not yet heard from Newmont what plans were in store for them. They noted that they 
lived between the mine and the nearest water testing station; thus they weren’t sure that the water 
they relied on was safe, or that any impurities would be detected. Their community school had 
been destroyed to make way for the mine; now students were forced to take a bus into town. Some 
children had gone without schooling for months owing to a lengthy dispute between the community 
and the government that arose after the children were re-assigned to a school with no electricity or 
running water. Villagers in another community that had largely been resettled were holding out for 
better resettlement rates, mainly, that they wanted to be able to continue in their farming lifestyle 
and not just be paid for their structures and crops.
We also met with community members who had been resettled. Compensation seemed to be a key 
driver of satisfaction. One interviewee described how the payments for resettlement were handled 
differently by different people depending on their financial acumen. Another noted that, despite 
expectations for a better life, compensation “accounted for around two years of field value,” and a 
third mentioned that after the compensation is spent, “people have nothing left.”
Community members described having fallow land (that did not have crops on it at the time) being 
taken without compensation, and only being compensated for buildings and crops. Different 
crops have different rates. One savvy farmer was experimenting with one type of crop that would 
generate a higher value than what he otherwise would have planted, just in case Newmont took his 
land away. Another noted that subsistence farmers were not experts and thus often just accepted 
whatever offer was given to them. He described a process by which the company first offered 
compensation for cocoa field destruction worth less than a year’s production; only with negotiation 
did the compensation rate rise to about 2.5 production years’ worth.
NGGL representatives pointed to the existence of committees, not unlike the Forum or SDCs, that 
exist specifically for compensation and resettlement. These multi-stakeholder committees use 
IFC processes, include other livelihood programs like vocational training and a vulnerable peoples 
program that includes support with food BAskets and health. They also noted that all “fenceline 
communities” in the Subika East mining area have been, or are being, resettled, and that they have 
begun processes to resettle other fenceline communities.
Government officials ascribed some of the blame in the disputed resettlement programs to “specu-
lative development” in which villagers build simple dwellings in towns slated for destruction to 
make way for the mine, hoping to get compensated. This acknowledges that mines could be better 
planned by engaging communities ahead of time, and mapping out properties and settlements, 
before a decision to mine. However, they noted that their view was that all people in the affected 
villages should be resettled.
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7. DISCUSSION
The experience of the Ahafo communities with respect to the implementation of the Ahafo BAs 
offers a number of relevant observations for community leaders, policymakers, and leading 
extractive industry companies. We divide these observations into two groups: those relating to the 
design and implementation of the Ahafo BAs, and those relating to Newmont’s performance around 
implementation.
7.1 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AHAFO BAs
It is easy to conclude from the conversations at roundtables on CSR and mining that getting to an 
agreement with the local community in mining projects is difficult but necessary, and from then on 
it’s all about working together. Yet, as we observed in Ahafo, the negotiation is just one step of a very 
complex process. What happens after the agreement is signed may require even more attention 
than the agreement itself. This is consistent with international human rights law and international 
best practices, as articulated by governments,220 international financial institutions,221 and extractive 
companies themselves,222 which stress the importance of ongoing, iterative consultations and 
community participation in decision-making. Relatedly, the question of whether the BAs will actually 
“benefit” the communities needs to be considered in the broader context of the social and envi-
ronmental impacts that the mine brings. Financial and other transfers to the communities will be 
of little significance if the social and environmental conditions needed for community livelihoods 
and survival are put at risk. This is why any “benefit agreement” may also include robust social and 
environmental protections designed to mitigate and avoid the project’s adverse impacts.
The first observation is that true multi-stakeholder agreement and implementation is hard. We 
observed that in spite of the wide swath of the community represented in the negotiations, 
they did not all have equal voice. Moreover, once the agreement was up and running, that same 
inequality of representation continued, with some community members having a louder voice than 
others. Consultation is another important element of multi-stakeholder participation—in this case, 
multi-stakeholder participation means that there are representatives for women, youth, farmers, 
etc.—but we found a distinctly poor degree of consultation between constituencies and their repre-
sentatives. Thus, what looks on paper like a multi-stakeholder dialogue or institution may in fact be 
not much more than a diverse set of attendees at a meeting run by, and for, an influential subset of 
participants. The lesson here is that the multi-stakeholder character of the agreement needs to 
go beyond ensuring presence, and actually target and facilitate meaningful and representa-
tive participation.
The second observation we noted concerns the formalization of community-company relations, and 
the new institutions generated by the Ahafo BAs. Institutions don’t always work as planned, and 
there is an extensive range of development literature that looks at the political economy of institu-
tions and explores themes like elite capture, suboptimal institutions, and poor links between citizen 
preference and ultimate policy choices.223 In the case of the Ahafo BAs, the representativeness of 
the new institutions set up—including the Forum, the SDCs, and the tender board—is ques-
tionable because these institutions suffered from weak consultation and replicated power 
imbalances. Sometimes they re-formalized existing power structures, like through giving chiefs a 
seat on the SDCs (perhaps not coincidentally leading to the construction and renovation of palaces 
throughout the host communities, funded by NADeF). They also generated new power players, 
or re-formalized existing ones, through structures such as the Standing Committee or the citizen 
validation process for local employment. 
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The new structures of the Ahafo BAs institutionalized processes that might have otherwise gone 
through more ad hoc mechanisms. Sometimes that formalization put up barriers that impeded 
meaningful interactions between different actors, creating a sort of “red tape” that when applied in 
other contexts like business regulation can prevent desired outcomes (like business registration) 
from occurring.224 In the case of the Ahafo BAs, we were struck by the fact that no one we spoke to 
had used the dispute mechanism, while many had given reasons for why they might not. On top 
of all this, no one we spoke to had read the agreements: the formalization of community-company 
relations created both distance and ignorance. The lesson from this second observation is that BAs 
need political economy analysis for their design, and not just lawyerly solutions. Political econ-
omy, the study of how political interests and institutions interact with economic outcomes, acknowl-
edges a world of “second bests” in which institutions are expected to be gamed for private interest. 
Politics should not only be considered at the stage of designing institutions under BAs; instead both 
the firm and host community should commit to ongoing political engagement instead of letting the 
committees and devices be run strictly by technocrats. If no one is willing to provide that high-level 
political attention, we would question the potential value of signing BAs in the first place. Any inter-
ventions to support community participants to participate should be equally conscious of, and seek 
to address, these political challenges. 
Our third observation is that BA design and implementation may contain unresolvable dilem-
mas, often relating to conflicts of interest. For example, involving local powerbrokers who are 
effective at representing the community presents both advantages and disadvantages. In many 
communities around the world, leaders are not representatives elected through a rigorous election 
process, and may be in a position of power because of inheritance or business success. In the 
case of Ahafo, these powerbrokers are tasked with speaking for the community and can bring the 
community around to work constructively with the company; yet by virtue of their outsized potential 
to benefit from the specifics of the BAs, these powerbrokers may also prevent the fair implementa-
tion of the BAs, or at least create the impression of unfair implementation. Another conundrum is 
the funding of the staff positions necessary to govern and implement the BAs, such as the moder-
ator or NADeF secretary in the case of the Ahafo BAs. Funding arrangements also have advantages 
and disadvantages. When a company takes on the financial responsibility to cover an officer’s salary, 
thereby reducing the financial pressure on the community or local government, it also creates an 
apparent conflict of interest, that the employee may feel incentivized to please the employer. 
Related to the third observation is that for BAs to be successful, they need an honest broker 
who can help to even out power and informational asymmetries. Communities need support 
for negotiation and ongoing operations and monitoring of the BAs to which they are a party. If they 
do not have that support, they will likely find themselves stymied by aspects of an agreement that 
nobody in the community understands. In Ahafo, we found that the local community at all levels 
was uninformed as to global best practices, and—as we have described—that there was insufficient 
community participation both during the negotiations and once the BAs were in operation. In 
other contexts, the company might be expected to pay for the community to get advice and for the 
general operations of the institutions created by the BAs. Yet as noted above, when the company 
directly pays for a service, or when there are financial gains to be had, in Ahafo many will likely 
suspect that the outcome will be unfair. Innovative solutions for financing support to communities 
are needed. One option is for an international organization or national government to fund technical 
support and trainings for communities to reduce information and power asymmetries. International 
organizations like the World Bank should consider stepping up to this role, or otherwise reduce their 
insistence on using BAs to provide solutions to company-community relations. Another option is for 
the company (or companies, if the solution is national) to fund an arms-length trust or foundation to 
take on such a role. 
A fifth observation, particularly relevant in those countries that do not legally require resource 
companies to negotiate agreements with local communities, is that the national government is a de 
facto party to the agreement whether it likes it or not. For one, royalties and other expenses that 
go to the community are in all likelihood deducted from taxable income. In Ghana, the corporate 
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income tax rate for mining and upstream petroleum companies is 35%,225 thus the government is in 
effect contributing more than a third of the allocation to NADeF and other community expenditures. 
Finally, it is worth noting that even when the government has no policy on BAs, that is in effect a 
policy. No policy means that there is likely to be a wide variety of approaches taken by different 
resource companies to manage community relations. It also means that more proactive companies 
like Newmont are likely to be called on to play roles outside of their core business activities; for 
instance, at one Forum meeting a chief asked Newmont to remind the national government to pay 
the communities their overdue royalties.226 The lesson from this fifth observation is that govern-
ments need to have a deliberate approach to community-company relations and benefit 
sharing; if they do not have an explicit approach, they should gather the kind of information that 
might lead to informed policy in the future.
7.2 TOWARDS BETTER CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
So, is Newmont doing a good job with the implementation of the Ahafo BAs? Nine years of winning 
awards from chambers of commerce and Ghanaian philanthropy events might suggest that it is. 
Yet it is a complicated question. There are many things going well, while others—including very 
fundamental issues, as raised in the earlier sections—could be improved. Most fundamentally, as we 
describe below, the impact of the Ahafo BAs on the communities is frankly impossible to measure. 
In this sub-section we describe several observations that should guide Newmont and other mining 
companies as they manage the implementation of BAs. 
The first observation is that there is a mismatch between different actors’ narratives concerning 
the BAs, which is reflected in the agreement’s administration and re-negotiation, and in commu-
nity-company relations more generally. The community’s narrative when signing the BAs was 
effectively “land for jobs”—not surprising, given the importance of the agricultural and residential 
land that Newmont would take. Narratives can be a very powerful feature mediating the governance 
of natural resources, influencing the population’s tendency towards conflict.227 This narrative of “land 
for jobs” would seem to be the one non-negotiable of the 2008 agreements, and indeed the corner-
stone of NGGL’s efforts in community relations. As such, in reaction to the largest single change to 
the BAs following 2014 renegotiations, the reduction of the headline job target by one third, the 
community was unsurprisingly upset. Further, as we discuss in the next observation, the company 
has not made its strongest case that it is upholding its end of the employment bargain. Our lesson 
here is that when there is a narrative around the signing of BAs, the implementation and 
follow-through should respect that narrative.
Second, there does not seem to be an active program of BA implementation monitoring and 
learning. These agreements are complex and, in 2008, in a setting like Ahafo, they were innovative. 
It would thus make sense to monitor them closely in order to improve performance. Yet, at least 
BAsed on our research, monitoring does not seem to be a significant part of the BAs’ implementa-
tion nor the culture around the BAs. This is not a problem specific to Newmont at Ahafo: a related 
CIRDI project on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of BAs has, in preliminary research, found a 
broad-BAsed weakness in agreement M&E. NGGL did hire a local consultancy to do an evaluation 
of NADeF, but to our knowledge there has been no evaluation of the RA nor the EA. (This itself may 
indicate that the company’s focus in the BAs was always more squarely on the financial benefits 
payable to NADeF, in contrast to the community’s focus on jobs.) Even more important than an 
evaluation (independent or otherwise) is regular monitoring and a culture of learning and improve-
ment. Transparency is one means to achieve this, for example with respect to employment figures, 
but these are hard to find unless, we are told, you attend a briefing and remember to ask for a copy 
of the PowerPoint slides. In the absence of monitoring and transparency regarding the key terms of 
the agreement, the numerous accolades won by Newmont and NGGL risk taking on the characteris-
tics of an echo chamber rather than reflecting actual performance. The lesson here is that ensuring 
that these agreements operate effectively is hard, and that a commitment to continuous improve-
ment (and the concomitant collection and dissemination of data) is probably the only way to 
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come close to getting implementation right. This commitment may need to be at the global level, 
such as Newmont’s commitment to performance monitoring of its social management plans.228
Third, and related to the second observation on monitoring and learning, it is nearly impossible to 
measure the impact of the Ahafo BAs. There are a number of reasons for this. One, as Community 
Empowerment Associates noted, there are no BAseline data collected against which to measure 
improvements.229 Luckily for future researchers, the Ghanaian census taken in 2010 measures 
literacy, schooling, employment, migration, and housing conditions, so in a careful study might 
measure the effects of the mine and BAs once the 2020 census data are available. Two, even if there 
were local BAseline data collected in 2008, it would be hard to establish the “counterfactual,” or what 
would have happened in the absence of the Ahafo BAs. The reason this is hard is that the largest 
shock to the community is probably the mine itself, with the BAs reducing the negative impact and 
increasing the benefits. Moreover, even in the absence of terms included in the agreement, as we 
note in the next observation, there may still be voluntary corporate activity or domestic law that 
would go partway to the behaviour codified in the BAs. A separate paper by Adebayo and Werker 
attempts to measure the potential economic impact of the Ahafo BAs at the time of their signing.230 
The lesson for here is that companies should establish a rigorous and transparent M&E system 
including BAseline data and to consider an enhanced M&E system including (a) data collection in 
“control” households not affected by the mine and agreements and (b) joint modeling of benefits 
with community stakeholders in order to anchor expectations around how their livelihoods might be 
affected.
Our fourth and final observation for company performance during implementation of the Ahafo BAs 
is that the agreements only govern a fraction of company-community relations. Some other aspects 
are determined by voluntary corporate action against the constraints of either domestic law or 
outside actors like the IFC. In Table 7-1, below, we describe some of the main community benefit or 
impact mitigation categories, and note what is determining NGGL’s behaviour in the case of Ahafo. 
Table	 7-1 Spheres	of	Company-Community	Interactions	in	the	Ahafo	Mine
Ad hoc voluntary 
corporate action
Codified in benefit 
agreements
Domestic law or coun-
terparty constraint
Local employment EA
Local procurement IFC Linkages
Environmental protec-
tion
Ghana law and regula-
tions
Resettlement Ghana law and IFC 
standards
Compensation Ghana law
Community develop-
ment 
Some mitigation 
projects
DFA
Source: Authors. The columns specify the constraints on corporate action, while the rows describe 
different responsibilities of the company with respect to the community.
The areas of the most controversy—resettlement and compensation, and environmental protec-
tion—fall outside of the relationship articulated in the BAs. The commitments in the voluntary BAs 
were inconsistent in their approach and application (i.e. falling back on national law rather than 
fully committing to one set of standards such as the IFC Performance Standards). Had communities 
been made aware of international best practice and expectations, these BA inadequacies might have 
been avoided. It is the norm that negotiations with informed communities with free and prior access 
to information, who have the capacity and opportunity provided by a fair negotiation process, will 
use international best practice (such as the IFC Standards) as a starting place for negotiating impact 
management, rather than accept sub-best practice commitments, as appears to have been done in 
this case. 
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Of course, community perception of the BAs is not just governed by the company’s performance 
along the dimensions of benefits and impact mitigation included in the agreements. One lesson 
here for companies is that a “weak link” in community relations, in which a commitment to 
best practice is avoided, can be hidden outside of the BAs but nonetheless may come back to 
bite. An additional lesson is that when the distribution of benefits and impact mitigation measures 
is institutionalized through the BAs, but those institutions do not evenly serve the population (as we 
noted earlier, because of local power players or weak capacity), there may be a need for additional 
company initiatives to target those individuals and groups left out of the new distribution.
7.3 CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 2019 REVIEW OF THE AHAFO 
BAs
Although the Relationship Agreement allows for amendments to the BAs at any time, NGGL repre-
sentatives say that a review happens every five years or so, with the next to be in 2019. Because 
we were asked how “best practice” might be improved, we offer some items for consideration 
during the next review. Since the study did not compare across mining properties with different 
arrangements for distributing benefits and mitigation efforts, we are unable to make specific policy 
recommendations regarding Ghana’s overall approach towards BAs. The spirit of these suggestions 
is to enable the Ahafo model to reach its fullest potential. Almost all of these suggestions are consis-
tent with Newmont’s own corporate policies, and various voluntary principles and guidelines (such 
as those of the International Council on Mining & Metals, where Newmont is a member). Indeed, a 
few of these recommendations look remarkably similar to those in Newmont’s own commissioned 
review of its community relations.231
7.4 IMPROVING FUTURE RENEGOTIATION PROCESSES FOR THE 
AHAFO BAs
While there are no reliable ways of completely resolving the political challenges and power imbal-
ances discussed above, the process of the 2018/2019 review could be made more fair and represen-
tative through consideration of the following suggestions. 
1. Provide community representatives with independent, experienced legal counsel 
during the entire renegotiation process. We appreciate the desire to negotiate an 
agreement between principals, and then have lawyers formalize it after the key terms have 
been worked out. That said, BAs around the world are already legalized and much of the 
experience for what constitutes a fair deal lies with lawyers who have negotiated in different 
contexts. Mining companies like Newmont have access to a global experience pool whereas 
a local community in rural Ghana does not. Lawyers ought to be available to the community 
to do more than just formalize an agreement and translate it to Twi; they should help the 
community understand trade-offs, consider new ideas, and be on the lookout for loopholes. 
Moreover, given the multiple communities and interest groups, more than a single lawyer 
may be required to negotiate for the interests of the different stakeholder groups. The selec-
tion of lawyers should take into account their potential to act independently, given the risks of 
political capture or influence by the company, the government or other potential clients.
2. Provide community representatives with independent technical assistance during the 
entire renegotiation process. Most of the BAs contain content that falls within the domain 
of experts, whether in environmental impact, finance, or local development (see, e.g. s. 8.2, 
par. 6, below). It would be hard for the communities to be considered informed without 
access to relevant technical expertise; this should be allocated to different groups as for legal 
counsel, as described above.
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3. Provide training to Forum members in advance of the renegotiations. Whatever 
expertise is brought in, it will be community members who will have to ultimately make the 
decisions and live with them. Our experience in the communities is that there would be both 
appetite for, as well as significant benefits from, a general training in the negotiation and 
implementation of benefit agreements. There is now a global experience BAse that Ahafo 
community leaders can tap into that can take some of the uncertainty out of the relationship 
with Newmont. Such training should not only focus on technical issues, but must also address 
the inherently political nature of stakeholder interactions and deliberation; to avoid elite 
community members dominating proceedings, any training interventions must also seek to 
nurture solidarity and support of different interests within the community.232 Such training 
should be provided to community members in addition to, and not instead of, legal and 
technical support.
4. Publicize future negotiations and consult widely with the community. In the run-up 
to the next set of discussions on the Ahafo BAs, all sides should be transparent with their 
constituents about the timing and content of the negotiations. Community leaders need to 
sensitize their communities that negotiations are uncertain, and do not necessarily result in 
better outcomes, and should thus seek input from community members regarding the most 
important aspects to reconsider as well as what concessions they might be willing to make in 
order to achieve new wins. 
5. Make the BAs available in plain-language, Twi versions. Given the mixed command of 
English in the Ahafo areas, and the fact that the legal language of the BAs is inaccessible to 
most people anywhere, all parties could make both the existing and revised agreements 
more accessible by translating them into Twi and converting any legalese in the BAs into plain 
language. This has already been done in agreements in other parts of the world. 
6. Include more representatives of the communities as signatories to the agreement. As 
we described in section 6.1.3, the copy of the amended agreement that we reviewed for this 
report was signed by just one chief. The Forum should discuss how many community leaders, 
and whether other community representatives—such as representatives of women’s groups 
and of youth—should also be signatories to the agreements. It can also consider other ways, 
such as roll-call votes, to create greater accountability and broader representation between 
Forum members and constituents.
7.5 IMPROVING THE AHAFO BAs
The parties coming together will have many ideas to improve the Ahafo BAs. It is not our goal here 
to prescribe changes to the agreements, which is ultimately a choice of the negotiating parties, but 
rather to suggest ideas for discussion that emerged from our research findings. 
1. A more representative Standing Committee and more trusted moderator. Given the 
power of the Standing Committee and moderator in the decision-making of the Forum, the 
legitimacy of the Forum could be enhanced if those important positions were seen to be 
chosen by all parties. One possibility is for the Forum to elect its own Standing Committee 
with a secret ballot, and to choose its own moderator in a competitive process following 
presentations of three potential candidates. 
2. An independent grievance mechanism. As it currently stands, the grievance mechanism 
effectively prevents many complaints, given that it runs through existing structures within the 
communities and that such structures are now intertwined with corporate interests through 
the Ahafo BAs and other arrangements. If members of the Forum wish to encourage all 
legitimate grievances to surface, they could consider a new independent structure such as 
an ombudsman or elected committee consisting of independent Forum members, in which 
grievances could be lodged privately and without fear of retribution or discrimination. Any 
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grievance mechanism in place should meet the effectiveness criteria of the UN Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (including that the mechanism is legitimate, accessible, predict-
able, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, a source of continuous learning, and BAsed on 
engagement and dialogue with the community).233 
3. Clear delineation as to what matters are under the jurisdiction of the Forum. The BAs at 
present assign the Forum the responsibility to oversee the implementation of the agreement 
and give the Forum power to establish committees and assign functions to them. Yet the 
actual jurisdiction remains vague. For example, it seems that community still has no influence 
on how the mine is conducted; this undermines the meaningfulness of consultation and of 
structures like the Forum, and also introduces the possibility for community discontent that 
may be expressed in vehicles outside the Forum. 
4. More ambitious compensation and resettlement standards. Rather than fall back on the 
Ghanaian law, the agreement could aspire to Newmont’s own standards, or those of the IFC. 
Though NGGL representatives told us that they continue to follow IFC standards, those could 
be formally included in the RA or a separate agreement. To offer meaningful protection to 
community members, such standards would need to be included in an agreement which is 
legally enforceable.
5. Local procurement development targets. If this agreement were being negotiated in 
Canada or Australia, it would almost certainly have either language promising programming 
around developing the capabilities of local suppliers and increasing their chances of winning 
bids, or targets around local contractor spend. Yet Canada and Australia are different from 
Ghana, given that the firms being targeted in the former are Indigenous rather than locally 
owned per se. The Ahafo Linkages program is an example of a program that could have been 
included in the BAs. 
6. More ambitious employment targets. The reduction in the local employment target from 
35% to 24% could be reversed, with a more ambitious target, expressed as full-time equiva-
lent employment, sought for the revised agreements. Targets on skilled positions could be 
included too. Modest, agreed-on penalties for failure to meet the target, such as a fine equal 
to the salary for each position in which a local is not employed below the target, payable to 
NADeF, could be a substitute for a low target. Such a fine would create a salient signal to both 
Newmont headquarters and local community members regarding NGGL’s failure to meet 
the employment targets. Redefining the profit term as a royalty. The 1% of net profit term 
presently determining the financial flows into NADeF is impossible to monitor at the local 
level, given that community members are not able to observe Newmont’s cash costs let alone 
“all inter-company transactions.” An equivalent transfer to NADeF, as occurred from the 1% 
of net profits term over the period 2008-2016, would have resulted from a more transparent 
formula which is as follows:  
 
  (International price of gold – Expected cash cost) x Volume gold sold x 0.7%
7. Where the expected cash cost is defined as $708/oz in 2013 (the average of the nine years of 
Newmont-reported data, set for the middle year of data) and is assumed to increase at 3% 
per year. Thus we have cash costs for 2008 of $629, 2009 of $648, and so on through $797 in 
2016. With a formulation like this, the community could see that rising gold prices will lead 
to higher contributions from the company, and vice versa, without having to second-guess 
whether some creative accounting is instead driving the fluctuations. By describing this 
formula, we do not wish to convey any view as to whether 0.7% is the “right” number, rather it 
is the number that is broadly comparable to the 1% in the existing agreement (and we do not 
mean to endorse, or criticize, the 1% in the initial agreement). A fair number might very well 
be different. Indeed, the right number might change BAsed on impact on the communities—
which might be higher or lower—from the underground mining and the realized impact of the 
first decade of the project as opposed to just expectations.
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8. Escalating, anticipatory targets. For each of procurement, employment, and royalty 
numbers, there is some predictability in terms of how the mine’s needs, the community’s 
needs, and the community’s capabilities will progress over time. For instance, NADeF schol-
arships and the lure of a massive gold mine in the neighbourhood are likely to lead to local 
citizens earning the qualification to be competent workers at the mine. Rather than have a 
company that is reactive (or defensive) in the face of these changes, the BA can simply antici-
pate them and chart out a fair path of obligations that changes over time.
9. Cross-community projects permitted under NADeF. At present, each community chooses 
their projects BAsed on the funding allocations, and there is a natural tendency to spend the 
budget. Yet as the communities grow and the local projects are completed, it may be worth 
considering more ambitious projects that cross community lines and might be more trans-
formative in preparing the area for life after the mine. Amendments to the funding formula 
could be considered to allow and encourage these projects to be conceived.
10. Auditing for gender awareness and inclusion of under-represented groups. While there 
are efforts in the Ahafo BAs to increase the representation of women, there still remains 
a gender imbalance in formal roles under the BAs. The BAs also still feature needlessly 
gender-specific language like “chairman” instead of “chairperson” that presupposes male 
leadership. Auditing to identify how where the agreement could be made inclusive could help 
bolster the degree to which entities established by the BAs are truly representative. At the 
same time as this audit, the parties could consider whether there are any groups that have 
not been represented during the first decade of the BAs that ought to have a formalized role, 
such as persons with a disability.
11. Making the agreements legally binding. In 2019, it will have been 11 years since the 
execution of the original Ahafo BAs, with all parties having accumulated trust and experience 
working together. It might be worth discussing whether to change the language in the RA and 
EA to make them legally enforceable. This would give all parties experience with a judicial 
backstop—creating a valuable experiment that could help inform Ghanaian policy regarding 
BAs going forward. 
7.5.1 Improving the Implementation of the Ahafo BAs
Regardless of the formal changes to the Ahafo BAs, there a number of changes to their implementa-
tion could lead to better outcomes, including more community trust and satisfaction concerning the 
operations. We suggest a number of operational fixes for consideration by the parties, mainly NGGL 
and NADeF.
1. Transparent meetings. Given the weak consultation by many representatives, a simple fix is 
available: make meetings, their minutes, and materials from any presentations given available 
in Newmont’s information offices and on the Internet. Agendas for the meetings should 
be similarly made available beforehand. This could be for Forum and Standing Committee 
meetings at a minimum.
2. Disaggregated jobs data. Much of the dissatisfaction with the EA stems from community 
members’ uncertainty about whether the jobs targets are being legitimately met. Although 
NGGL presents slideshows containing aggregate employment statistics, this does not align 
with the information the community often demands. It would be useful to see disaggregated 
jobs data, described by community; gender ratios; whether jobs are casual, part-time, or 
full time; whether jobs are temporary or ongoing; whether jobs are management, skilled, 
unskilled, among other potential criteria. In other contexts it is quite simple to count full-time 
equivalents—in other words, counting two half-time employees as one full-time equivalent 
employee. The data ought to be made more accessible.
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3. Transparency around NADeF contributions. Given the fluctuating contributions of NADeF 
and their weak correlation to the gold price, there was understandable confusion among 
community members about why NADeF funds were declining. Newmont could make the 
BAsis for the contributions clear at the corporate level, and publish the components (e.g. oz 
sold, revenue, costs) in order to eliminate speculation regarding the fairness of the contribu-
tion. 
4. Capacity building on consultation and participation. Members of the Forum and SDCs 
have responsibilities for which they often do not have extensive training or experience. Capac-
ity building on community consultation and effective participation could be contemplated for 
members of these important entities.
5. Sufficient time for consultation before decisions. Forum meetings during which decisions 
are made would ideally allow for members to be able to consult with their constituencies 
before casting their vote or contributing to a consensus-BAsed decision. Sufficient time should 
be planned for to allow community members to be advised well in advance as to what is up 
for discussion, and how that might affect them, so that they have time to communicate their 
opinions to their representatives.
6. Closely monitoring and adjusting how deliberative processes operate to maximize 
the extent to which they are participatory. The BAs establish various useful forums for 
communication between different stakeholders. These should be used to maintain regular 
contact about how processes are working, and to collaboratively work towards making them 
more participatory. Where problems arise or improvements are suggested, the parties should 
build consensus to adjust processes as needed.
7. Participatory environmental and social monitoring. The RA specifies that community 
members should participate in environmental and social impact monitoring programs, yet 
these programs had not begun at the timing of our visit. The first step is to begin outreach to, 
and sensitization of, the community, and to co-design a plan for how community members 
will be able to participate in such an approach. In order to have effective participation, 
community members would need to be trained and have access to independent technical 
assistance; selection would also have to ensure that no potential conflicts of interest—such 
as fear of lost employment or contracts— might arise, or that such conflicts are adequately 
managed. To be truly participatory, the scope of what will be monitored should also be co-de-
signed with community members. Best practice would also suggest that impacts on human 
health be included as one aspect of the mine’s social and environmental impacts that should 
be monitored closely, that plans for mine closure be made, and that the company supports 
open, disaggregated, updated, and user-friendly data.
8. Costing transparency for NADeF projects. At present, SDCs must choose projects without 
knowing how much they might cost, and our research showed that community-level estimates 
often differed substantially from the final bill. We understand that the cost range is communi-
cated to the SDCs but from the community perspective it did not appear that this information 
arrived in time to affect the decision on which projects to fund. Improving the information to 
SDCs about the cost of potential projects without delaying their implementation would benefit 
all parties and likely lead to better project selection.
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